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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
On Information Theoretic and Distortion-based Security
by
Gaurav Kumar Agarwal
Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Christina Panagio Fragouli, Chair
In this thesis, we consider secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper. With the
explosion in the growth of the data produced and communicated, sensitive information such as
financial transactions, health records, and control signals for cyber-physical systems, has to be
securely exchanged. Today, the ever-increasing computational power of adversaries is challeng-
ing the state-of-the-art cryptographic encryption mechanisms, as these mechanisms assume adver-
saries with limited computational power. Thus, with the advent of the quantum computing era, we
require new mechanisms to guarantee a secure exchange of information. Moreover, the growing
number of small and energy constrained connected devices involved in data exchange calls for
lightweight encryption schemes, as low-complexity devices cannot implement complex schemes.
We consider three different scenarios and exploit specific opportunities present in each of these
scenarios; we develop lightweight encryption schemes that do not require sharing large keys in
advance and are secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited computational capabilities.
The first scenario we consider is multiple unicast traffic over wireline networks. In these net-
works, a single source is connected tom destinations interested in different messages. In designing
encryption schemes, we exploit the fact that although the eavesdropper is computationally super-
powerful, it might not have capabilities to eavesdrop the entire network. We use the multi-path
diversity to securely communicate against the eavesdropper without requiring any pre-shared key.
The second scenario we consider consists of millimeter wave (mmWave) networks. mmWave
communication requires deploying networks of relays that communicate through directional beams
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to compensate for the high path-loss and the high blockage. Since we need to use beamforming and
align beams to activate links, we cannot use all the underlying links of the network simultaneously.
However, the degree of freedom in choosing the links to activate can be leveraged for secure
communication against an eavesdropper. We show that we can achieve a secure capacity that in
some cases, can be very close to the unsecure capacity. Here, capacity refers to the maximum flow
of information over the network.
For the third scenario, we consider cyber-physical systems and propose a distortion based se-
curity framework where the distortion measures the distance between the eavesdropper’s estimates
and the ground truth. The primary motivation for this framework is that the messages exchanged
in these systems are embedded in a metric space having a notion of distance, and securing raw bits
as in traditional encryption schemes might not be necessary. Instead, we show with an example of
a linear dynamical system that a carefully designed encryption scheme can significantly distort the
eavesdropper’s view with just one bit of the pre-shared key.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The enormous growth in the data we are communicating over the Internet is such that in the last
two years we have exchanged 90% of the data communicated in the entire history [DOM19].
Today, we are exchanging thousands of gigabytes of data per second over communication net-
works [DOM19]. Moreover, it is not just the communicated data that is growing; the number of
connected devices involved in this exchange of information is also rapidly expending [STA19],
and we are expected to have around 75 billion connected devices in the next five years.
A large portion of this enormous data exchanged among the billions of small and low-complexity
devices is sensitive in nature, such as banking, health, personal, and proprietary information.
Therefore, we need to securely exchange this sensitive information against eavesdropping adver-
saries who have interests in gaining access to this information.
With an increase in the processing power and a move towards an era of quantum comput-
ing [Aro19], these adversaries are gaining more and more power. Their empowerment calls for
new mechanisms to guarantee the secure exchange of information. The primary reason for this
need is that state-of-the-art encryption methods such as RSA public-key cryptosystems rely on
the assumption that the adversary has limited computational capabilities. In other words, the en-
crypted symbols exchanged over the networks in these schemes contain complete information
about the messages, but the adversary is assumed to be computationally incapable of extracting the
messages from the encrypted text. If the adversary is instead endowed with strong computational
power or a quantum computer, however, messages can be decrypted, and RSA cryptosystems are
no longer secure. Moreover, due to the low-complexity of the devices such as ones used in the
Internet of things (IoT), it is not possible to implement the hash functions used in RSA cryptosys-
tems. Because of these challenges, low-complexity encryption methods that are secure even against
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quantum computers, are going to be necessary and are gaining significant research attention.
One such cipher that is secure against quantum computers and that low-complexity devices can
implement, known as one-time-pad, is illustrated in Fig. 1.1a. This cipher was first introduced in
the 19th century and was proved to be secure [Sha49] against an adversary having infinite compu-
tational power (quantum computers). Fig 1.1a shows a source S exchanging a message W with
the destination D using a key K. The key K is a random symbol that is agreed upon before the
communication, i.e., it is pre-shared. However, every time we use such a cipher, we need a new
pre-shared key of length equal to the length of the message W . Pre-sharing such large keys and
refreshing them becomes impractical with the scale of data and the number of parties involved in
today’s communication networks.
𝑆
𝐷
Key: 𝐾
Message: 𝑊
𝑊
+
𝐾
Key: 𝐾
(a)
𝑆
𝐷
𝐾1𝐾2
𝑊
+
𝐾
1
+
𝐾
2
(b)
𝑆
𝐷1 𝐷2
(c)
Figure 1.1: (a) One-time-pad. (b) Exploiting limited network presence of the adversary. (c) A
network with single source and two destinations.
The primary goal of this thesis is to develop encryption schemes that (1) do not make any as-
sumption on the computational power of the adversary, and (2) are of low-complexity, requiring
either no or a small pre-shared key. In this thesis, we focus on three different scenarios, namely
(a) multiple unicast traffic over wireline networks, (b) millimeter wave networks, and (c) distor-
tion based security for cyber-physical systems. In each of these scenarios, we exploit specific
characteristics of these systems to develop such encryption schemes.
2
1.1 Multiple unicast traffic over wireline networks
The first scenario we consider is secure communication for multiple unicast traffic over a wireline
network model. The wireline network model abstracts the network connectivity using a graph
with edges representing noiseless and non-interfering links. In this scenario, we build on the fact
that, although the adversary is assumed to be computationally super-powerful, it may not have the
capability to be present everywhere on a network. We exploit this limited presence of the adversary
to design secure communication schemes that do not require a pre-shared key.
Cai et al. [CY02] first leveraged the limited network presence of the adversary. We illustrate
this in Figure 1.1b with a toy example. In this example, the source S is connected to the destination
D with three parallel edges, so at each use of the network, the source S can send three messages
to the destination D. However, using two random symbols K1 and K2, the source S can instead
securely communicate a message W against an adversary eavesdropping any two edges of the
network. In other words, the destination D can correctly decode the message W based on the
information received on three paths whereas the adversary cannot. For the adversary, information
eavesdropped on any two edges will be completely useless, i.e., information theoretically will
have zero mutual information [CT06] with the message. This technique can be generalized to any
network topology (not just the network with parallel paths in Fig. 1.1b) for traffic consisting of
only one source and one destination on the network (also called unicast traffic in the literature).
Formally, for an arbitrary network with unicast traffic, if the source S can send M messages to the
destination D in the absence of any eavesdropper, then, using the scheme of [CY02], the source
can instead sendM−k messages securely to the destinationD against an adversary eavesdropping
any k edges. Note that the source and the destination do not know which k edges are eavesdropped.
Traffic consisting of a single source sending same messages to a set of destinations on a net-
work is termed multicast in the literature (see Fig. 1.1c for an example with both destinations
interested in a message W from the source S). The seminal paper by Ahlsewede et. al., [ACL00]
showed that for the multicast traffic, if the source can communicateM messages to each destination
by exclusively using the entire network resources, then, using coding operations (called network
coding) at intermediate nodes of the networks, the source can communicate M messages to all the
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destinations simultaneously. The result in [CY02] also applies to the multicast traffic, i.e., if the
source can communicate M messages to all destinations, it can also simultaneously communicate
M − k messages securely to all the destinations against an adversary eavesdropping any k edges.
The traffic we consider in this thesis consists of a single source interested in communicating
different messages to different destinations. In the literature, this traffic is termed as multiple
unicast (for example, from the source S in Fig. 1.1c, destinations D1 and D2 are interested in
a message W1 and a message W2, respectively). The maximum number of messages the source
can communicate to different destinations can be found using the multi-commodity routing algo-
rithm [CLR09, KM03] over the network. We make advances in answering the question of how
many messages the source can securely communicate to different destinations in the presence of
an adversary eavesdropping any k edges of the network. It is worthwhile to note here that a more
general traffic consists of multiple source-destination pairs; for each source-destination pair, the
destination is interested in a message from the corresponding source. However, characterizing the
maximum flow of information over such networks remains an open problem [KTW14] even when
there is no eavesdropping adversary. Thus, we restrict ourselves to the case of single source when
there is an eavesdropping adversary.
The single source assumption also allows us to exploit the fact that, even if the messages
are different for every destination, we can use common random symbols (such as K1 and K2 in
Fig. 1.1b) for securing the messages against an adversary eavesdropping any k edges. Moreover,
we show that in a network, not all the edges are equally suitable for sending common random
packets (multicast traffic), and in order to get the optimal performance, (that is to communicate the
maximum number of private messages securely), we need to exploit specific sub-networks to send
common random packets. We find these sub-networks by first defining the notion of separable
networks and then using this notion to identify the sub-networks suited for multicasting.
1.2 Millimeter wave networks (1-2-1 networks)
In the second scenario, we consider the problem of secure communication in millimeter wave
networks. Millimeter wave communication uses a much broader available spectrum (bandwidth)
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in the high-frequency region. In particular, it occupies the frequency spectrum from 30 GHz to 300
GHz. The availability of this large spectrum is poised to enable streaming of ultra-high definition
videos, and communication among a large number of autonomous vehicle platoons in 5G mobile
communication [All15].
(a) Transmitter beamforming in
1-2-1 networks.
(b) Receiver beamforming in 1-
2-1 networks.
(c) Matching of transmitting and
receiving beams.
Figure 1.2: Transmitting and receiving over 1-2-1 networks
However, transmissions at such high frequency suffer from high path-loss and high blockage.
Thus, a transmitting node needs to use an array of antennas to beamform in a narrow direction, as
shown in Fig. 1.2a. Similarly, a receiving node needs to steer its receiving antenna in a particular
direction, as shown in Fig. 1.2b. The 1-2-1 (one-to-one) model [ECF18] abstracts this directivity:
to establish a communication link, both the millimeter wave transmitter and receiver employ an-
tenna arrays that electronically steer to direct their beams towards each other, as shown in Fig. 1.2c.
With this constraint of alignment of the beams to establish a communication link, we cannot
use all network resources at a time. For example, in Fig. 1.3a, the source S is connected to the
destination D via N relays/paths. However, if every node has only one transmitting and one
receiving antenna to beamform, out of N paths from the source to the destination, we can only use
one path at a time, as shown in Fig. 1.3b.
The freedom to select this path out of N choices provides an opportunity for security against
an adversary who eavesdrops a fixed set of edges. For instance, in the example in Fig. 1.3a, the
maximum number of messages the source S can send to the destination D is just one, as we can
5
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4
Transmitting Antenna
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𝑆
2
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(b)
Figure 1.3: (a) An example of 1− 2− 1 network model. (b) Transmission on one chosen path.
only use one path at a time. However, by employing a time-varying selection for this path, the
source can securely transmit at a rate of (1− k
N
) against an adversary eavesdropping any k edges.
In particular, in each use of this network, the source selects a different path and communicates a
different symbol. With this, in N uses, the source delivers N different symbols. The adversary
eavesdropping on k edges will be able to overhear transmissions of at most k of them. Using
a standard coding scheme like Reed-Solomon code, the source can hence securely communicate
N−k messages in N network uses. Thus, only a fraction k/N of the packets is lost when securing
against the adversary. In contrast, in the wireline network model, where a node can transmit and
receive on all outgoing and incoming edges respectively, a rate of k is lost in providing security.
In this thesis, we will generalize this for networks having arbitrary topology and characterize the
secure capacity for single source and single destination networks by using a time-varying selection
of the sub-networks without requiring any pre-shared key.
1.3 Distortion based security for cyber-physical systems
For the third scenario, we consider communication in cyber-physical systems (CPS) where com-
munication, computations, and control are intertwined. The messages exchanged over these net-
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works are control signals or the states of the systems. These messages are embedded in a metric
space, i.e., a space with a notion of distance (for example, the speed of a moving car or the location
of a flying drone). We will exploit this fact to design lightweight encryption schemes. In particular,
we will design schemes in which, instead of having an adversary who does not learn anything about
the message, we force the adversary’s estimations to be “quite far” from the original message.
For example, consider a drone flying, as depicted in Fig. 1.4a. At every time instance, the drone
moves between adjacent squares inside the grid and wants to communicate its location to a control
server. An eavesdropper, also interested in the location of the drone, overhears this communication.
Since at any time the drone is in one of the 64 positions, it can use an encryption based on the one-
time-pad (see Fig. 1.1a) and communicate its position securely by using a 6 bits long secret key
per time instance. However, if we only require the adversary’s estimate to be sufficiently far from
the actual position, we do not require a key of this size. Towards this end, we define the notion of
distortion-based security that maximizes the difference between the adversary’s estimate and the
ground truth (i.e., the actual position).
(a) Protection of the most significant bit.
Actual 
Trajectory
Mirroring Point
(Center)
Mirrored 
Trajectory
(b) Mirroring based scheme.
Figure 1.4: Example of drone motion
However, the challenge is in designing encryption schemes that follow the underlying system
dynamics. For instance, flipping the most significant bit in the representation of the location, as
shown in Fig. 1.4a leads to a trajectory which is inconsistent with the system dynamics. Thus, with
this encryption the adversary is able to separate out the fake trajectory form the actual trajectory,
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and thus she learns the actual trajectory.
For this particular example, it turns out that if the adversary has to make a random guess that
minimizes the distance from the actual location, then the adversary estimates the location of the
drone at the origin. Thus, a good encryption scheme strives to keep the adversary’s estimate close
to the origin even when she has some information. We use the following encryption scheme, where
the drone either sends its actual location or a “mirrored” version of it, as shown in Fig. 1.4b. This
scheme keeps the adversary’s estimate precisely at the origin.
In this thesis, we generalize this mirroring scheme and show that in the distortion-based se-
curity framework, a single bit of pre-shared key is sufficient for any linear dynamical system to
communicate its state securely (such as the one shown in Fig. 1.4a).
1.4 Main contributions
For the three scenarios considered in this thesis, our major contributions are as follows. The work
on distortion based security for cyber-physical systems is joint work with another Ph.D. student
Mohammed Karmoose.
Multiple Unicast Traffic over Wireline Networks:
We characterize the secure capacity region for networks with two destinations having arbitrary
topology. Using the notion of “separable networks” and their reduction to a two-layer network
topology, we characterize the secure capacity region for additional classes of networks having more
than two destinations. Finally, we provide a polynomial-time heuristic for securely communicating
over networks with arbitrary topology and an arbitrary number of destinations.
Millimeter Wave Networks (1-2-1 Networks):
We consider arbitrary 1-2-1 networks with unit capacity edges and derive lower and upper bounds
on the secure capacity. We also characterize the secure capacity for a particular network topology
called diamond networks where the edges can have arbitrary edge capacities.
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Distortion Based Security for Cyber-Physical Systems:
We identify security measures based on assessing the distance of the adversary’s estimates from
the ground truth. In particular, we provide both average-case and worst-case performance guar-
antees. For the average-case distortion, we develop a scheme which uses exactly one bit of the
pre-shared key and can provide maximum possible distortion (equivalent to the eavesdropper with
no observations) in some cases. For the worst-case distortion, we design a scheme that uses 3 bits
of the pre-shared key per dimension and prove that it achieves the maximum possible distortion
when the inputs to the systems are independent of the previous states.
1.5 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. The standard notation used throughout the thesis is given in
Section 1.6. Section 1.7 gives an overview of the related literature in information theoretic secrecy
over networks, and security over cyber-physical systems. Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
analyze the three secure communication scenarios of interest, i.e., multiple unicast traffic, mil-
limeter wave networks and distortion based security, respectively. Finally, future directions and
open questions are discussed in Chapter 5.
1.6 Notation
Throughout this thesis, we adopt the following notation convention. Calligraphic letters indicate
sets; ∅ is the empty set and |A| is the cardinality ofA; for two setsA1,A2,A1 ⊆ A2 indicates that
A1 is a subset of A2, A1 ∪ A2 indicates the union of A1 and A2, A1 unionsq A2 indicates the disjoint
union of A1 and A2, A1 ∩ A2 is the intersection of A1 and A2 and A1\A2 is the set of elements
that belong to A1 but not to A2; [n1 : n2] is the set of integers from n1 to n2 ≥ n1; [n] is the set of
integers from 1 to n ≥ 1; [x]+ := max{0, x} for x ∈ R; for a vector a, aT is its transpose vector;
dim(A) is the dimension of the subspace A; 0i×j is the all-zero matrix of dimension i× j; Ij is the
identity matrix of dimension j; for a matrix A of dimension m × n, AT is the transpose of A, Ar
is the r-th power of A, rk(A) is the rank of A, and A|S denotes the submatrix of A of dimension
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|S| × n where only the rows indexed by the set S ⊆ [m] are retained. X and Xa denote column
vectors, andXba = [X
′
aX
′
a+1 · · · X ′b]′ for b ≥ a and a, b ∈ Z; fX(x) denotes the probability density
function of a random vector X; for any random vector Y , we denote the mean and covariance
matrices of Y by µY and RY respectively, (for example, the mean and the covariance matrix of Xba
are denoted by µXba and RXba respectively).
In several parts of this thesis, we represent a network with a directed acyclic graph G = (V , E),
where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of directed edges. The edges represent orthogonal
communication links, which are interference-free. If an edge e ∈ E connects a node i to a node j,
we refer to node i as the tail and to node j as the head of e, i.e., tail(e) = i and head(e) = j. For
each node v ∈ V , we define I(v) as the set of all incoming edges of node v and O(v) as the set of
all outgoing edges of node v.
1.7 Related work
We first give a brief overview of the information theoretic secure communication for a point to
point channel model. Following this, we mention related work in each of the three scenarios
considered in this thesis.
Information theoretic security, pioneered by Shannon [Sha49], aims at ensuring a reliable and
secure communication among trusted parties inside a network such that a passive external eaves-
dropper does not learn anything about the content of the information exchanged. For point-to-
point channels, information theoretic security can be achieved provided that the communicating
trusted parties have a pre-shared key of entropy at least equal to the length of the message [Sha49].
Wyner [Wyn75] showed that, if the adversary’s channel is a degraded version of the channel to the
legitimate destination, then an information theoretic secure communication can be guaranteed even
without the pre-shared keys. Moreover, if public feedback is available, Maurer [Mau93] showed
that secure communication can be ensured over erasure networks even when the adversary has a
channel of better quality than the legitimate receiver.
Multiple unicast traffic over wireline networks: In [CY02], Cai et al. characterized the
information theoretic secure capacity of a noiseless network with unit capacity edges and with
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multicast traffic. This seminal works, which was followed by several others [FMS04, ES07], con-
siders a case where a source wishes to multicast the same information to several destinations in the
presence of a passive external adversary eavesdropping any k edges of her choice. In [CHK13a],
Cui et al. studied networks with non-uniform edge capacities when the adversary is allowed to
eavesdrop only some specific subsets of edges. Over the past few years, other notions of informa-
tion theoretic security have been analyzed, such as the case of weak information theoretic secu-
rity [BN05, SK09, WYG10]. Moreover, several different scenarios have been studied, that include:
(i) the case of an active adversary, who can indeed maliciously corrupt the communication rather
than just passively eavesdropping it [JLK07, HLK04, KTT09]; (ii) erasure networks where a public
feedback is available [PCF15, ACF16, CPD14, PCF14]; (iii) wireless networks [MSC08, DCN09].
Millimeter wave networks (1-2-1 networks): For our work on millimeter wave networks, we
leverage directivity and multipath for security. The fact that directivity can help with security has
been observed in the context of MIMO beamforming [MS11, SCA16]; in these works, the main
observation is that, by creating a narrow beam, we can limit the locations where the adversary can
collect useful information - or at least, significantly weaken her channel, so as to utilize wiretap
coding. Exploiting multipath for security over lossless networks with unit capacity links has no-
tably been used in secure network coding [CY02]. The results, however, are only for “traditional
networks”, where a node can communicate to other nodes using all the edges it is connected with.
This is significantly different for millimeter wave networks where a node can only transmit to one
among its neighbors at each point in time.
Distortion based security for cyber-physical systems: The study of distortion based secu-
rity, where the goal is to maximize the distortion of an eavesdropper’s estimate on a message, was
started by Yamamoto [Yam88]. Schieler and Cuff [SC14] later showed that, in the limit of an
infinite block length (n) code, only log(n) bits of the pre-shared key are needed to achieve the
maximum possible distortion. However, Schieler and Cuff also showed that such secrecy is rather
fragile: a causal disclosure of even a single message symbol can compromise the secrecy of the
entire block. This issue raises because the coding scheme involves infinite block length. We here
design schemes with block length equal to one, which obviates the need to wait and accumulate
data at the sensor. It also removes the fragility of the distortion based measure as now we do
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not need to code a sequence of symbols jointly, and can rather code each symbol independently.
Unlike information theoretic security, distortion security of alphabet A, does not imply distortion
security of alphabet B which is a one-to-one mapping of A. Wiese et al. studied a different no-
tion of secure estimation in [WJO16] where they considered zero-error secret capacity. Secure
communication in control systems is studied in [TGP17, TGP16, TSS17, MMS13, CDH16]. Se-
curing the system state from an adversary was explored in [TGP17, TGP16], where an asymptotic
steady-state analysis was investigated. Information-theoretic security was explored in [TSS17],
where the mutual information was used as a privacy measure. Security of the terminal state is con-
sidered in [MMS13] where an adversary makes partial noisy measurements of the state trajectory.
Differential privacy for control systems was explored in [CDH16], which uses standard statisti-
cal indistinguishability which is equally applicable to categorical (non-metric space) data. In our
work, we use the estimation error of the adversary in order to quantify privacy, utilizing the fact
that CPS data lies in a metric space having a notion of distance, as argued earlier.
12
CHAPTER 2
Multiple Unicast Traffic over Wireline Networks
Even for different messages requested by various destinations, the source can use the same random
symbols for all the destinations to securely communicate against an eavesdropper. Moreover, to
get the optimal performance, these random symbols have to be multicasted through a suitable
selection of sub-network that is identified using the notion of separable networks.
2.1 Summary
This chapter investigates the problem of secure communication in a wireline noiseless network
model where a source wishes to communicate to a number of destinations in the presence of a
passive external adversary. Different from the multicast scenario, where all destinations are inter-
ested in receiving the same message, in this setting different destinations are interested in different
messages. The main focus of this chapter is on characterizing the secure capacity region.
Towards this end, an outer bound on the secure capacity region is derived, and secure transmis-
sion schemes are designed and analyzed in terms of achieved rate performance. It is first shown
that, for the case of two destinations, the designed scheme matches the outer bound, hence charac-
terizing the secure capacity region.
To study networks consisting of more than two destinations, a particular class referred to as
two-layer networks is considered, where the source communicates with the destinations by hopping
information through one layer of relays. It is shown that the designed scheme achieves the capacity
for any two-layer network for which any of the following three conditions is satisfied: (i) the
number of destinations is three, (ii) the number of edges eavesdropped by the adversary is one, (iii)
the min-cut capacities satisfy a specific constraint.
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We show that the class of two-layer networks is sufficient to model a more general class called
separable networks. The main feature of separable networks is that they can be partitioned into
edge-disjoint networks that satisfy specific min-cut properties. In particular, we prove that the
secure capacity region of any separable network can be characterized from the secure capacity
region of the corresponding two-layer network.
Finally, for an arbitrary network topology, a polynomial-time two-phase scheme is designed
and its performance is compared with the outer bound.
Organization: Section 2.2 formally defines the setup of the multiple unicast wireline noiseless
network with a single source and arbitrary number of destinations, and formulates the problem.
Section 2.3 derives an outer bound on the secure capacity region. Section 2.4 provides a capacity-
achieving secure transmission scheme for networks with two destinations and arbitrary topology.
Section 2.5 designs a secure transmission scheme for networks with a two-layer topology and ar-
bitrary number of destinations. Section 2.5 also derives some secure capacity results and shows
connections between two-layer networks and separable networks. Section 2.6 provides a two-phase
achievable scheme for networks with arbitrary number of destinations and arbitrary topology.
2.2 Setup and problem formulation
The networks considered here have a source node S and m destination nodes Di, i ∈ [m]. The
source node does not have any incoming edges, i.e., I(S) = ∅, and each destination node does not
have any outgoing edges, i.e., O(Di) = ∅,∀i ∈ [m]. Source S has a message Wi for destination
Di, i ∈ [m]. These m messages are assumed to be independent. Thus, the network consists of
multiple unicast traffic, where m unicast sessions take place simultaneously and share the network
resources. A passive eavesdropper/adversary Eve is also present in the network and can eavesdrop
any k edges of her choice. Note that this assumption implies that Eve has limited network pres-
ence; this is equivalent to a scenario where there are several non-collaborating adversaries, each
observing a different subset of k edges. We also highlight that Eve is an external eavesdropper,
i.e., she is not one of the destinations.
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The symbol transmitted over n channel uses on edge e ∈ E is denoted as Xne . In addition, for
Et ⊆ E we define XnEt = {Xne : e ∈ Et}. We assume that the source node S has infinite sources of
randomness Θ, while the other nodes in the network do not have any randomness.
Over this network, we are interested in finding all possible feasible m-tuples (R1, R2, . . . , Rm)
such that each destination Di, i ∈ [m], reliably decodes the message Wi (with zero error) and
Eve receives no information about the content of the messages. In particular, we are interested in
ensuring perfect information theoretic secure communication, and hence we aim at characterizing
the secure capacity region, which is next formally defined.
Definition 1 (Secure Capacity Region). A rate m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) is said to be securely
achievable if there exist a block length n with Ri =
H(Wi)
n
, ∀i ∈ [m] and a set of encoding
functions fe, ∀e ∈ E , over a sufficiently large finite field Fq with
Xne =
 fe
(
W[m], θ
)
if tail(e) = S,
fe ({Xn` : ` ∈ I(tail(e))}) otherwise,
such that each destination Di can reliably decode the message Wi i.e.,
H (Wi|{Xne : e ∈ I(Di)}) = 0, ∀i ∈ [m].
Moreover, we also require perfect secrecy, i.e.,
I
(
W[m];X
n
EZ
)
= 0, ∀ EZ ⊆ E such that |EZ | ≤ k.
The secure capacity region is the closure of all such feasible rate m-tuples.
Definition 2 (Min-cut). A cut is an edge set EA ⊆ E , which separates the source S from a set
of destinations DA := {Di, i ∈ A}. In a network with unit capacity edges, the minimum cut
or min-cut is a cut that has the minimum number of edges. Throughout the paper, we denote by
MA the capacity of the min-cut between the source S and the set of destinations DA := {Di, i ∈
A},A ⊆ [m], and we refer to MA as the min-cut capacity.
In Definition 1, we require perfect secrecy, i.e., no matter which (at most) k edges Eve eaves-
drops, she does not learn anything about the content of the messages. In particular, throughout the
paper, we will use the following condition on perfect secrecy proved in [CY07, Lemma 3.1].
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Lemma 1. Let W be the message vector that has to be transmitted, and K be a vector of uniform
i.i.d. symbols independent of W . Then, the vector X representing the symbols transmitted over the
edges of the network can be represented in matrix form as
X =
[
A B
]W
K
 ,
whereA andB are the encoding matrices. This transmission scheme is perfectly secure if and only
if
rk
([
A B
]∣∣∣
Z
)
= rk (B|Z) , ∀|Z| ≤ k.
2.3 Outer bound
In this section, we derive an outer bound on the secure capacity region of a multiple unicast wireline
noiseless network with a single source and m destinations. In particular, as stated in Theorem 2,
this region depends on the min-cut capacities between the source and different subsets of destina-
tions, and on the number of edges that the adversary eavesdrops. The next theorem provides the
outer bound region.
Theorem 2. An outer bound on the secure capacity region for the multiple unicast traffic over
networks with a single source and m destinations is given by
RA ≤ [MA − k]+, ∀A ⊆ [m] , (2.1)
where RA :=
∑
i∈A
Ri, and where MA is defined in Definition 2.
Proof. Let EA be a min-cut between the source S and DA and EZ ⊆ EA be the set of k edges
eavesdropped by Eve, and define I(DA) :=
⋃
i∈A I(Di). If |EA| < k, let EZ = EA. We have
nRA = H(WA)
(a)
= H(WA)−H(WA|XnI(DA))
(b)≤ H(WA)−H(WA|XnEA)
(c)
= I(WA;XnEZ , X
n
EA\EZ )
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= I(WA;XnEZ ) + I(WA;X
n
EA\EZ |XnEZ )
(d)
= I(WA;XnEA\EZ |XnEZ )
(e)≤ H(XnEA\EZ )
(f)≤ n[MA − k]+ ,
where WA = {Wi, i ∈ A} and: (i) the equality in (a) follows because of the decodability con-
straint (see Definition 1); (ii) the inequality in (b) follows because of the ‘conditioning reduces
the entropy’ principle and since XnI(DA) is a deterministic function of X
n
EA; (iii) the equality in (c)
follows from the definition of mutual information and since EA = EZ ∪ EA\Z ; (iv) the equality
in (d) follows because of the perfect secrecy requirement (see Definition 1); (v) the inequality in
(e) follows since the entropy of a discrete random variable is a non-negative quantity and because
of the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle; (vi) finally, the inequality in (f) follows since
each link is of unit capacity and since |EA \ EZ | = [MA− k]+. By dividing both sides of the above
inequality by n we obtain that RA in (2.1) is an outer bound on the secure capacity region of the
multiple unicast traffic over networks with single source and m destinations. This concludes the
proof of Theorem 2.
2.4 Capacity achieving scheme for networks with two destinations
In this section, we prove that the outer bound in Theorem 2 is tight for the case of m = 2 destina-
tions and arbitrary k. Towards this end, we design a secure transmission scheme whose achievable
rate region matches the outer bound in Theorem 2. Our scheme follows the works of [CY02]
and [Sha49], where the source shares k keys (i.e., uniformly at random generated packets) with
each destination, as well as information packets encoded with the k keys. As a result, by observing
any k edges, the eavesdropper cannot extract any information about the messages. The main novel
observation in our scheme is that, although the source transmits a private message to each receiver,
we do not need to necessarily use a private key to encrypt each private message, but instead we can
re-use the same key for multiple destinations. Thus, in some cases, we need to multicast keys to
the destinations, although we never need to multicast encoded messages. Moreover, this scheme
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has the special property that we can isolate the key and encrypted message transmissions: we use
some part of the network to convey (potentially multicast) the keys, and the remaining part to com-
municate the encrypted messages (i.e., the messages encoded with the keys). Our main result is
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The outer bound in (2.1) is tight for the case m = 2, i.e., the secure capacity region
of the multiple unicast traffic over networks with single source and m = 2 destinations is
R1 ≤ [M{1} − k]+ , (2.2a)
R2 ≤ [M{2} − k]+ , (2.2b)
R1 +R2 ≤ [M{1,2} − k]+ . (2.2c)
Proof. Clearly, from the result in Theorem 2, the rate region in (2.2) is an outer bound on the
secure capacity region. Hence, we now need to prove that the rate region in (2.2) is also achievable.
Towards this end, we start by providing the following definition of separable graphs, which we will
leverage in the design of our scheme.
Definition 3 (Separable Graph). A graph G = (V , E) with a single source and m destinations is
said to be separable if it can be partitioned into 2m − 1 edge disjoint graphs (graphs with empty
edge sets are also allowed). These graphs are denoted as G ′J = (V , E ′J ),J ⊆ [m],J 6= ∅ and are
such that E ′J ⊆ E and E ′J ∩ E ′L = ∅, ∀J 6= L ⊆ [m]. Moreover, their min-cut capacities satisfy
the following condition
MA =
∑
J⊆[m]
J∩A6=∅
M ′J , ∀A ⊆ [m], (2.3)
where, for the graph G, MA is defined in Definition 2, and the graph G ′J has the following min-cut
capacities: (i) M ′J from the source S to any non-empty subset of destinations in J , and (ii) zero
from the source S to the set of destinations {Di : i ∈ [m] \ J }.
To better understand the above definition, consider a graph G with m = 2 destinations. Then,
the graph G is separable if it can be partitioned into 3 edge disjoint graphs such that:
• G ′{1} has the following min-cut capacities: M ′{1} from S to D1 and zero from S to D2,
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• G ′{2} has the following min-cut capacities: zero from S to D1 and M ′{2} from S to D2,
• G ′{1,2} has the following min-cut capacities: M ′{1,2} from S to D1, M ′{1,2} from S to D2 and
M ′{1,2} from S to {D1, D2},
where the quantities M ′{1}, M
′
{2} and M
′
{1,2} can be computed using the following set of equations:
M{1} = M ′{1} +M
′
{1,2}, (2.4a)
M{2} = M ′{2} +M
′
{1,2}, (2.4b)
M{1,2} = M ′{1} +M
′
{2} +M
′
{1,2}. (2.4c)
An example of separable graph for m = 2 and its partition into 3 edge disjoint graphs is shown in
Fig. 2.1. We now state the following lemma, which is a consequence of [RW09, Theorem 1] and
which we will use to prove the achievability of the rate region in (2.2).
Lemma 4. [RW09, Theorem 1]: Any graph with a single source and m = 2 destinations is
separable.
By leveraging the result in Lemma 4, we are now ready to prove Theorem 3. In particular, we
consider two cases depending on the value of k (i.e., the number of edges that the eavesdropper
eavesdrops). Without loss of generality, we assume that k < mini∈[2]M{i}, as otherwise secure
communication to the set of destinations {Di : k ≥ M{i}, i ∈ [2]} is not possible at any positive
rate, and hence we can just remove this set of destinations from the network. To secure our mes-
sages from the adversary, we use uniform random packets generated at the source, which we refer
to as keys. We will transmit these keys as well as the messages encoded with these keys over the
network. The security of our schemes relies on two aspects: (i) a message encoded with a uniform
random key is independent of the message and is distributed uniformly, and (ii) the amount of keys
that we use is such that the eavesdropper cannot collect a sufficient number of keys and encoded
messages to be able to extract any information on the messages.
1. Case 1: k ≥ M ′{1,2}. In this case, by substituting the quantities in (2.4) into (2.2), we
obtain that the constraint in (2.2c) is redundant. Thus, we will now prove that the rate pair
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(R1, R2) = (M{1} − k,M{2} − k) is securely achievable, which along with the time-sharing
argument proves the achievability of the entire rate region in (2.2).
We denote with K1, K2, . . . , Kk the k key packets and with W
(1)
i ,W
(2)
i , . . . ,W
(Ri)
i (with
i ∈ [2]) the Ri message packets for Di. With this, our scheme is as follows:
• We multicast the key packets Ki,∀i ∈ [M ′{1,2}], to both D1 and D2 using G ′{1,2}, which
has edges denoted by E ′{1,2}. This is possible since G ′{1,2} has a min-cut capacity M ′{1,2}
to both D1 and D2 (see Definition 3).
• We unicast the key packets K`,∀` ∈ [M ′{1,2} + 1 : k], to Di,∀i ∈ [2], using k −M ′{1,2}
paths out of the M ′{i} disjoint paths in G ′{i}. We denote by Eˆ{i} the set that contains
all the first edges of these paths. Clearly, |Eˆ{i}| = k −M ′{1,2},∀i ∈ [2]. Notice that
Eˆ{i} ⊆ E ′{i},∀i ∈ [2] (see Definition 3).
• We send the Ri,∀i ∈ [2], encrypted message packets (i.e., encoded with the keys) of
Di on the remaining M ′{i} − k + M ′{1,2} disjoint paths in G ′{i}. We denote by E¯{i} the
set that contains all the first edges of these paths in G ′{i}. Clearly, |E¯{i}| = Ri, ∀i ∈ [2],
E¯{i} ⊆ E ′{i} and E¯{i} ∩ Eˆ{i} = ∅ (see Definition 3).
This scheme achieves Ri = M ′{i} − k + M ′{1,2} = M{i} − k,∀i ∈ [1 : 2], where the second
equality follows by using the definitions in (2.4). Now we prove that this scheme is also
secure. We start by noticing that, thanks to Definition 3, the edge sets E ′{1,2}, Eˆ{i} and E¯{i},
with i ∈ [2], are disjoint. We write these transmissions in a matrix form (with G and U being
the encoding matrices of size `× k and (R1 +R2)× k, respectively) and we obtain

XE ′{1,2}
XEˆ{1}
XEˆ{2}
 =

g11 g12 . . . g1k
g21 g22 . . . g2k
...
... . . .
...
g`1 g`2 . . . g`k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
G

K1
K2
...
Kk
 , ` = |E
′
{1,2}|+ 2
(
k −M ′{1,2}
)
,
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 XE¯{1}
XE¯{2}
 =

u11 u12 . . . u1k
u21 u22 . . . u2k
...
... . . .
...
...
... . . .
...
ur1 ur2 . . . urk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
U

K1
K2
...
Kk
+

W
(1)
1
...
W
(R1)
1
W
(1)
2
...
W
(R2)
2

, r = R1 +R2 .
We here highlight that on the remaining edges E\{E ′{1,2} ∪ Eˆ{1} ∪ E¯{1} ∪ Eˆ{2} ∪ E¯{2}} of
the network, we either do not transmit any symbol or simply route the symbols from XE¯{1} ,
XE¯{2} , XEˆ{1} , and XEˆ{2} (corresponding to the symbols transmitted on disjoint paths). Thus,
without loss of generality, we can assume that Eve eavesdrops at most k edges from {E ′{1,2}∪
Eˆ{1} ∪ E¯{1} ∪ Eˆ{2} ∪ E¯{2}}. In what follows, we let: (i) X denote the vector of the symbols
transmitted over these edges, (ii) K be the vector of the k random key packets, and (iii) W
be the vector of the message packets for both destinations. With this, X can be represented
in a matrix form as
X =
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
 W
K
 . (2.5)
We highlight that the first |E ′{1,2}| rows of G (i.e., those that correspond to multicasting the
keys) are determined by the network coding scheme for multicasting [ACL00]. As such, they
can be constructed in O (|E|3) by using the multicasting scheme of [JSC05], which requires
a finite field of size m = 2. Thus, the security follows if we can show that for any choice
of G, there exists a U such that (2.5) satisfies the condition in Lemma 1. This is proved
in Appendix A.1 where we show that, over a sufficiently large finite field, a random choice
of U in (2.5) satisfies the condition in Lemma 1 with high probability. Thus, the rate pair
(R1, R2) = (M{1} − k,M{2} − k) is securely achievable.
2. Case 2: k < M ′{1,2}. By substituting the quantities in (2.4), the rate region in (2.2) becomes
Ri ≤M{i} − k = M ′{i} +M ′{1,2} − k,∀i ∈ [2] , (2.6a)
R1 +R2 ≤M{1,2} − k = M ′{1} +M ′{2} +M ′{1,2} − k . (2.6b)
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We now show that we can achieve the following two corner points i.e., the rate pair
(R1, R2) =
(
(1− α)(M{1,2} −M{2}) + α(M{1} − k),
(1− α)(M{2} − k) + α(M{1,2} −M{1})
)
(a)
= (M ′{1} + α(M
′
{1,2} − k),M ′{2} + (1− α)(M ′{1,2} − k)) , (2.7)
for α ∈ {0, 1}, where the equality in (a) follows by using the definitions in (2.4). This, along
with the time-sharing argument, proves the achievability of the entire rate region in (2.6). We
recall that we denote withK1, K2, . . . , Kk the k key packets and withW
(1)
i ,W
(2)
i , . . . ,W
(Ri)
i
(with i ∈ [2]) the Ri message packets for Di. With this, our scheme is as follows:
• Using the graph G ′{1,2} we multicast to both destinations D1 and D2: (i) Ki,∀i ∈ [k],
(ii) α(M ′{1,2} − k) encrypted message packets (i.e., formed by encoding W1 and the
keys K) for D1 and (iii) (1− α)(M ′{1,2} − k) encrypted message packets (i.e., formed
by encoding W2 and the keys K) for D2. Recall that the edges of the graph G ′{1,2} are
denoted by E ′{1,2} (see Definition 3). Note that, since all these packets are multicast,
then D1 might also receive packets that are for D2, and vice versa. However, note
that, since the eavesdropper is external, i.e., it is not one of the destinations, then this
does not violate the security condition, as long as the adversary, who eavesdrops any k
edges of her choice, does not learn anything about the content of the messages. We also
highlight that the message packets multicast to the two destinations are encoded using
the key packets, where the encoding is based on the secure network coding result on
multicasting [CY02], which ensures perfect security from an adversary eavesdropping
any k edges.
• We send M ′{i} encrypted message packets of Di (i.e., encoded by using the k key pack-
ets) on the M ′{i} disjoint paths to Di in the graph G ′{i}, and denote by Eˆ{i} the set that
contains all the first edges of these paths for i ∈ [2].
This scheme achieves the rate pair in (2.7). Now we prove that this scheme is also secure.
For ease of representation, in what follows we let R′1 = α(M
′
{1,2} − k) and R′2 = (1 −
α)(M ′{1,2} − k). We again notice that, thanks to Definition 3, the edge sets E ′{1,2}, Eˆ{1} and
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Eˆ{2} are disjoint. We write these transmissions in a matrix form (with G, S and U being the
encoding matrices of sizes `× k, `× t and r × k respectively) and we obtain,
XE ′{1,2} =

g11 g12 . . . g1k
g21 g22 . . . g1k
...
... . . .
...
g`1 g`2 . . . g`k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
G

K1
K2
...
Kk
+

s11 s12 . . . s1t
s21 s22 . . . s1t
...
... . . .
...
s`1 s`2 . . . s`t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
S

W
(1)
1
...
W
(R′1)
1
W
(1)
2
...
W
(R′2)
2

,
where ` = |E ′{1,2}| and t = R′1 +R′2, and
 XEˆ{1}
XEˆ{2}
=

u11 u12 . . . u1k
u21 u22 . . . u2k
...
... . . .
...
...
... . . .
...
ur1 ur2 . . . urk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
U

K1
K2
...
Kk
+

W
(R′1+1)
1
...
W
(R1)
1
W
(R′2+1)
2
...
W
(R2)
2

, r=R1+R2−(M ′{1,2}−k) .
In what follows, we let: (i) X denote the vector of the symbols transmitted over the edges
E ′{1,2}, Eˆ{1} and Eˆ{2}, (ii) K be the vector of the k random key packets, and (iii)
W ′ :=

W
(1)
1
...
W
(R′1)
1
W
(1)
2
...
W
(R′2)
2

, W
′′
:=

W
(R′1+1)
1
...
W
(R1)
1
W
(R′2+1)
2
...
W
(R2)
2

.
With this, X can be represented in a matrix form as
X =

XE ′{1,2}
XEˆ{1}
XEˆ{2}
 =
 S 0`×r G
0r×t Ir U


W ′
W
′′
K
 . (2.8)
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Similar to Case 1, on the remaining edges E\{E ′{1,2} ∪ Eˆ{1} ∪ Eˆ{2}} of the network, we either
do not transmit any symbol or simply route the symbols from {XEˆ{1} , XEˆ{2}} (correspond-
ing to the symbols transmitted on disjoint paths). Thus, without loss of generality, we can
assume that the eavesdropper eavesdrops at most k edges from {E ′{1,2} ∪ Eˆ{1} ∪ Eˆ{2}}. We
highlight that the matrices G and S are determined by the secure network coding scheme
for multicasting [CY02]. As such, they can be constructed in O (k2|E|k+2) by using the
scheme of [KOK17], which requires a finite field of size |E|k. Thus, security follows if we
can show that for any choice of S and G satisfying the security condition in Lemma 1, i.e.,
rk
([
S G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
,∀|Z| ≤ k, there exists a choice of U such that the
security condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied for (2.8). This is proved in Appendix A.2 where
we show that, over a sufficiently large finite field, a random choice of U in (2.8) satisfies the
condition in Lemma 1 with high probability.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
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𝐷1 𝐷2
(a) G0.
𝑆
𝐷1 𝐷2
(b) G′{1}.
𝑆
𝐷1 𝐷2
(c) G′{2}.
𝑆
𝐷1 𝐷2
(d) G′{1,2}.
Figure 2.1: A 2-destination separable network G0 in (a) and its partition into 3 edge disjoint graphs
in (b), (c) and (d). Here, M ′{1} = M
′
{2} = 1, and M
′
{1,2} = 2.
Example 1: We here illustrate the above described scheme for the network G0 in Fig. 2.1(a). We
first note that G0 has min-cut capacitiesM{1} = M{2} = 3 andM{1,2} = 4, and it can be partitioned
into three edge disjoint graphs G ′J ,J ⊆ {1, 2},J 6= ∅ as shown in Figs. 2.1(b)-(d), with min-cut
capacities equal to M ′{1} = M
′
{2} = 1 and M
′
{1,2} = 2, respectively. We assume that the adversary
eavesdrops any k = 2 edges of her choice. For this case, the source should be able to securely
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communicate at a rate (R1, R2) = (1, 1) towards the m = 2 destinations. This rate pair can be
achieved using two key packets K1 and K2 and operations over F4 as follows:
1. Over the set of edges in G ′{1}, the source transmits W1 + K1 + 2K2; the intermediate node
simply routes this transmission to D1;
2. Over the set of edges in G ′{2}, the source transmits W2 + K1 + 3K2; the intermediate node
simply routes this transmission to D2;
3. Over the set of edges in G ′{1,2}, the source multicasts K1 and K2 to the receivers. It transmits
K1 to one intermediate node and K2 to the other intermediate node. The intermediate node
denoted as i in Fig. 2.1(d) receives K1 and K2 and transmits K1 + K2 on its outgoing
edges. Thus D1 and D2 receive both K1 and K2. It therefore follows that Di, i ∈ [2],
can successfully recover Wi. 
We conclude this section with some observations on separable graphs. As highlighted in the
proof of Theorem 3, given the separation of a graph into subgraphs, our capacity achieving scheme
is polynomial-time. However, identifying the subgraphs with the required min-cut properties is not
an easy problem [RW09], and it is not clear if it can be performed in polynomial-time. Moreover,
although for the case of m = 2 destinations any graph is separable (see [RW09, Theorem 1]), in
general the same does not hold for m ≥ 3, as the following example illustrates.
Example 2: Consider the network in Fig. 2.2, which consists of m = 3 destinations and has the
following min-cut capacities: M{1} = 1, M{2} = 1, M{3} = 1, M{1,2} = 2, M{2,3} = 2, M{1,3} = 2
and M{1,2,3} = 2. With this, we can find M ′J , J ⊆ [3], by solving (2.3). In particular, we obtain:
M ′{1} = M
′
{2} = M
′
{3} = 0, M
′
{1,2} = M
′
{2,3} = M
′
{1,3} = 1 and M
′
{1,2,3} = −1. Since a graph can
not have a negative min-cut capacity, we readily conclude that a separation of the form defined in
Definition 3 is not possible. 
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𝑆𝐷1 𝐷3𝐷2
Figure 2.2: Example of a non-separable graph.
2.5 Secure scheme for two-layer networks
In Section 2.4, we characterized the secure capacity region of networks with m = 2 destinations,
by leveraging the separability property. In this section, we discuss separable networks with ar-
bitrary number of destinations and characterize the capacity region of networks with: (i) m = 3
destinations, where the adversary eavesdrops any arbitrary k edges of her choice, (ii) networks with
arbitrary number m of destinations, where the adversary eavesdrops any k = 1 edge of her choice,
and (iii) networks with arbitrary values of k and m for which the min-cut capacities satisfy certain
properties. Towards this end, we will first consider a special class of separable networks, namely
networks having a two-layer topology, and design a secure scheme for this class of networks. We
will then show that, in order to characterize the secure capacity region of any separable network,
it is sufficient to study two-layer networks. In particular, we will prove that any separable network
can be modeled as a two-layer network with the same min-cut capacities, and that a secure scheme
for a two-layer network can be transformed into a secure scheme for its corresponding separable
network. We now proceed by formally defining the two-layer network topology.
Definition 4. A two-layer network consists of one source S that wishes to communicate with m
destinations, by hopping information through one layer of t relays. As such, a two-layer network
is parameterized by: (i) the integer t, which denotes the number of relays in the first layer; (ii) the
integerm, which indicates the number of destinations in the second layer; (iii)m setsMi, i ∈ [m],
such thatMi ⊆ [t], whereMi contains the indexes of the relays connected to destination Di.
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𝑆𝐷1 𝐷3𝐷2
Figure 2.3: Two-layer network example which illustrates that using different parts of the network
to transmit the keys and the encrypted messages is not optimal. In this networkM1 = {1, 2, 3, 4},
M2 = {1, 2, 5, 6} andM3 = {3, 4, 5, 6}.
An example of a two-layer network is shown in Fig. 2.3, for which t = 6, m = 3, M1 =
{1, 2, 3, 4},M2 = {1, 2, 5, 6} andM3 = {3, 4, 5, 6}.
Before delving into the study of such two-layer networks, recall that the capacity-achieving
scheme for m = 2 destinations described in Section 2.4 uses some parts of the network to convey
(potentially multicasting) the keys and the remaining part to communicate the encrypted messages.
Therefore, we now ask the following question: can we extend this idea to get a capacity-achieving
scheme for separable networks with arbitrary number of destinations? In other words, can we
spatially isolate the key from the message transmission? The next example shows that this is not
possible through an example.
Example 3: Consider the two-layer network shown in Fig. 2.3, which consists of m = 3 destina-
tions, and where the adversary can eavesdrop any k = 3 edges of her choice. For this network we
have the following min-cut capacities: M{1} = M{2} = M{3} = 4, M{1,2} = M{1,3} = M{2,3} =
M{1,2,3} = 6. We would like to show that the triple (R1, R2, R3) = (1, 1, 1) – obtained from the
outer bound in Theorem 2 – can not be achieved when the key packets and the encrypted messages
are transmitted over different parts of the network. It is not difficult to see that, out of the 6 out-
going edges from the source, multicasting 3 keys1 requires a number of edges strictly greater than
1Note that 3 keys are required since the adversary eavesdrops k = 3 edges of her choice.
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4. Thus, we would be left with strictly less than 2 edges, which are not sufficient to transmit 3
message packets, i.e., one for each destination. It therefore follows that, with this strategy, the rate
triple (R1, R2, R3) = (1, 1, 1) can not be securely achieved.
However, let the source transmits the following symbols on its outgoing edges
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6

=

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 2 4
1 0 0 1 3 2
4 6 4 1 4 2
2 4 2 1 5 4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

W1
W2
W3
K1
K2
K3

, (2.9)
where B ∈ F6×67 is the encoding matrix. If the intermediate nodes simply route the received
symbols, then we can achieve the rate tuple (1, 1, 1). This is because, the encoding matrix B can
be written as
B =
[
B′ B
′′
]
,
where B′ contains the first three columns of B in (2.9), and B′′ contains the last three columns of
B in (2.9). Thus, it follows that
rk
([
B′ B
′′
]∣∣∣
Z
)
= rk
(
B
′′
∣∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ 3,
which, from Lemma 1, implies that the encoding in (2.9) is secure.
Moreover, each destination can decode its respective message as follows:
• Destination 1: W1 = 6X1 + 3X2 + 4X3 +X4,
• Destination 2: W2 = 6X1 + 4X2 + 3X5 +X6,
• Destination 3: W3 = 5X3 + 6X4 +X5 + 2X6 .
Thus, the rate triple (R1, R2, R3) = (1, 1, 1) can be securely achieved. This example shows
that using different parts of the network to transmit the keys and the encrypted messages, in general
is not optimal. This is partially due to the fact that destinations do not need to decode each key
individually, as long as they can successfully recover their message. 
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2.5.1 Secure transmissions scheme
For two-layer networks, we have MA = |∪i∈AMi|. For notational convenience, we let M∩{i,j} =
|Mi∩Mj| andM∩{i,A} = |Mi∩(∪j∈AMj) |. Moreover, we also assume thatM{i} ≥ k,∀i ∈ [m]
(otherwise secure communication is not possible) with M∅ := k for consistency.
We here propose a polynomial-time (see Lemma 6) secure transmission scheme for two-layer
networks. In Section 2.5.2, we will then derive its achieved rate region. The source S encodes the
message packets with k random packets and transmits these packets on its outgoing edges to the t
relays. We can write the received symbols at the t relays as

X1
X2
...
Xt
 =
 M | V


W1
W2
...
Wm
K

, (2.10)
where: (i) Wi, i ∈ [m] is a column vector of Ri message packets for destination Di, (ii) K is a
column vector which contains the k random packets, (iii) M is an encoding matrix of dimension
t × (∑mi=1Ri) (as we will show below such a matrix can always be constructed so that all the
destinations correctly decode their intended message), and (iv) V is a Vandermonde matrix of
dimension t × k. The matrix V is chosen for security purposes, i.e., any set of k rows of V are
linearly independent and hence Lemma 1 ensures that, no matter which k rows (i.e., edges) Eve
eavesdrops, she will learn nothing about the messages W[m].
Remark 1. The only property of V that we require in our scheme is the Maximum Distance Sep-
arable (MDS) property (i.e., any k rows of V are linearly independent). This implies that, even if
we select a random matrix V˜ instead of V , with high probability (close to 1 for large field size)
we will have a secure scheme for the two-layer network. This also implies that a finite field of size
O(|E|) can deterministically provide such a matrix V˜ .
Each relay i ∈ [t] will then forward the received symbol Xi in (2.10) to the destinations to
which it is connected. As such, each destination will observe a subset of symbols from {X1, X2, . . . , Xt}
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(depending on which of the t relays it is connected to). Finally, destination Di, i ∈ [m] selects a
decoding vector and performs the inner product with [X1, X2, . . . , Xt]. In particular, this decoding
vector is chosen such that it has two characteristics: (1) it is in the left null space of V , i.e., in the
right null space of V T ; this ensures that each destination is able to cancel out the random packets
(encoded with the message packets); (2) it has zeros in the positions corresponding to the relays
it is not connected to; this ensures that each destination uses only the symbols that it actually ob-
serves. In other words, all the decoding vectors that Di can choose belong to the right null space
Ni of the matrix Vi defined
Vi =
V T
Ci
 , (2.11)
where Ci is a matrix of dimension t¯ × t, with t¯ being the number of relays to which Di is not
connected to. In particular, each row of Ci has all zeros except a one in the position corresponding
to a relay to which Di is not connected to.
For instance, for the network in Fig. 2.3, we have
C1 =
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , C2 =
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
 , C3 =
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
 .
We let T be a matrix of dimension (
∑m
i=1Ri) × t that, for each destination Di, i ∈ [m], contains
Ri decoding vectors that belong to the right null space of the matrix Vi in (2.11), denoted as Ni.
Mathematically, we have
T =

−−−− d(1)1 −−−−
−−−− d(1)2 −−−−
...
−−−− d(1)R1 −−−−
−−−− d(2)1 −−−−
...
−−−− d(m)Rm −−−−

, (2.12)
where d(i)j denotes the j-th decoding vector (of length t) selected from the null space Ni, with
i ∈ [m], j ∈ [Ri]. Note that, if for all i ∈ [m], we can select Ri decoding vectors from Ni such
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that all the d(i)j in (2.12) are linearly independent (i.e., such that T has a full row rank), then it is
possible to construct the matrix M in (2.10) such that
TM = I(
∑m
i=1Ri)
, (2.13)
which ensures that all the destinations are able to correctly decode their intended message as

Wˆ1
...
Wˆm
 = T

X1
...
Xt
 (2.10)= [TM TV ]

W1
...
Wm
K

= TM

W1
...
Wm
+ TV K =

W1
...
Wm
 .
In Appendix A.3, we propose an iterative algorithm (of polynomial-complexity as formally proved
in Lemma 6) to select Ri, i ∈ [m] decoding vectors from Ni such that T in (2.12) has indeed a full
row rank. The performance of the proposed algorithm is provided in the following lemma, which
is also proved in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 5. For any given permutation pi = {pi(1), . . . , pi(m)} of [m], it is possible to select
Rpi(i) = dim
(
i∑
j=1
Npi(j)
)
− dim
(
i−1∑
j=1
Npi(j)
)
, i ∈ [m], (2.14)
vectors from Npi(i) so that all the
∑m
i=1 Ri selected vectors are linearly independent.
Remark 2. Note that, since there are m! possible permutations of [m], then Lemma 5 offers m!
possible choices for selecting Ri, i ∈ [m] vectors from Ni so that all the
∑m
i=1Ri selected vectors
are linearly independent. We prove in Lemma 7 that these choices form the corner points of the
secure rate region achieved by our scheme.
Remark 3. The result in Lemma 5 implies that rate m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm), with Ri, i ∈ [m]
being defined in (2.14), can be securely achieved by our proposed scheme.
The following lemma analyzes the complexity of designing our proposed secure scheme.
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Lemma 6. The complexity of designing the secure transmission scheme in (2.10) equalsO(m|E|4).
Moreover, a field size of dimension q ≥ |E| is sufficient.
Proof. To achieve any rate m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) using our scheme, we need to find a basis of
null spaces Ni, ∀i ∈ [m] and then use the iterative algorithm proposed in Appendix A.3 to form
the decoding matrix T in (2.12). A basis of the null space Ni can be found using the Gaussian
elimination algorithm, which has a complexity of O(|E|3) [AHM07]. The iterative algorithm in
Appendix A.3 for selecting decoding vectors in these null spaces requires discarding dependent
vectors, which has a complexity of O(m|E||E|3). This follows since: (i) there are at most m|E|
vectors in the basis of these null spaces, and (ii) to check if each vector is dependent on the previ-
ously selected vectors, we requireO(|E|3) computations using the Gaussian elimination algorithm.
Finally, given the decoding matrix T , we require the computation of the encoding matrixM which,
as highlighted in (2.13), is the right inverse of T . Thus, computing M requires O(|E|3) operations
by again using the Gaussian elimination algorithm. It therefore follows that the overall complexity
of our secure transmission scheme is O(m|E|4).
As discussed in Remark 1, to ensure security we are using only the MDS property of the
Vandermonde matrix V in (2.10). The size of this matrix is t× k, and t ≤ |E|. Thus, a field size of
dimension |E| is sufficient. This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.
In the next section, we will leverage the result in Lemma 5 and Remark 2 to derive the secure
rate region achieved by our proposed scheme.
2.5.2 Achieved secure rate region
In this section, we derive the rate region achieved by the secure scheme described in Section 2.5.1.
In particular, we have the following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 7. The secure rate region achieved by the proposed scheme is given by
0 ≤
∑
i∈A
Ri ≤ dim
(∑
i∈A
Ni
)
, ∀A ⊆ [m], (2.15)
where Ni is the right null space of the matrix Vi in (2.11).
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In the remainder of this section, we prove that the secure rate region in (2.15) is indeed the
secure capacity region when: (i) the adversary eavesdrops any k = 1 edge of her choice (and
arbitrary m); (ii) there are m = 3 destinations (and arbitrary k); (iii) k and m are arbitrary, but the
network has some special structure in terms of minimum cut.
2.5.3 Secure capacity for k = 1, m arbitrary
In this section, we consider the case where Eve eavesdrops any k = 1 edge of her choice, and
characterize the secure capacity region. In particular, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 8. For the two-layer network when Eve eavesdrops any k = 1 edge of her choice, the
secure capacity region is ∑
i∈A
Ri ≤MA − CA, ∀A ⊆ [m], (2.16)
with CA being the number of connected components in an undirected graph where: (i) there are
|A| nodes, i.e., one for each i ∈ A; (ii) an edge between node i and node j, {i, j} ∈ A, i 6= j,
exists ifMi ∩Mj 6= ∅.
2.5.3.1 Outer bound
We show that the outer bound in Theorem 2 can be equivalently written as in (2.16). Let Vi, i ∈
[CA], represent the set of nodes in the i-th component of the graph constructed as explained in
Theorem 8. Then, clearly A = ⊔CAi=1 Vi and we can write∑
i∈A
Ri =
∑
i∈V1
Ri +
∑
i∈V2
Ri + . . .+
∑
i∈VCA
Ri
(a)≤ (MV1 − k) + (MV2 − k) + . . .+
(
MVCA − k
)
(b)
= MV1∪V2∪...∪VCA − kCA
(c)
= MA − kCA
k=1
= MA − CA,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows by applying (2.1) for each set Vi, i ∈ [CA], (ii) the equality
in (b) follows since, by construction,Mi ∩Mj = ∅ for all i ∈ Vx and j ∈ Vy with x 6= y, and
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(iii) the equality in (c) follows since A = ⊔CAi=1 Vi. Thus, (2.1) implies (2.16). Moreover, since
CA ≥ 1, (2.16) implies (2.1). This shows that the rate region in Theorem 8 is an outer bound on
the secure capacity region when k = 1.
We now consider an example of a two-layer network and show how the upper bound derived
above applies to it.
Example 4: Let A = {2, 3, 4}, and assume thatM1 = {1, 2},M2 = {3, 4},M3 = {4, 5, 6} and
M4 = {7, 8}. Then, we construct an undirected graph such that: (i) it has 3 nodes since |A| = 3
and (ii) it has an edge between node 2 and node 3 sinceM2 ∩M3 = {4} 6= ∅. It therefore follows
that this graph has CA = 2 components. In particular, we have∑
i∈A
Ri =
∑
i∈V1
Ri +
∑
i∈V2
Ri ≤M{2,3,4} − 2k k=1= 4, (2.17)
where V1 = {2, 3} and V2 = {4}. 
2.5.3.2 Achievable rate region
We here show that the rate region in Theorem 8 is achieved by the scheme described in Sec-
tion 2.5.1. In particular, we show that
dim
(∑
i∈A
Ni
)
≥MA − CA, ∀A ⊆ [m], (2.18)
where recall that dim
(∑
i∈ANi
)
is the secure rate performance of our proposed scheme in Sec-
tion 2.5.1 (see Lemma 7). The condition in (2.18) can be equivalently written as ∀A ⊆ [m],
MA − CA ≤ dim
(∑
i∈ANi
) (a)
= dim
(
(∩i∈AVi)⊥
)
= t− dim (∩i∈AVi) ,
where the equality in (a) follows by using the property of the dual space and rank nullity theorem,
and Vi, i ∈ A is defined in (2.11). In other words, we next show that
∀A ⊆ [m], dim (∩i∈AVi) ≤ t−MA + CA. (2.19)
Towards this end, we would like to count the number of linearly independent vectors x ∈ Ftq that
belong to (∩i∈AVi).
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We note that, by our construction: (i) V T consists of one row (since k = 1) of t ones, and (ii) Ci
has zeros in the positions indexed byMi. Hence, if a vector belongs to Vi, then all its components
indexed byMi have to be the same, i.e., either they are all zeros, or they are all equal to a multiple
of one. Thus, we have q choices to fill such positions indexed byMi.
Now, consider Vj with j ∈ A and j 6= i. By using the same logic as above, if a vector belongs
to Vj , then all its components indexed by Mj have to be the same and we have q choices to fill
these. We now need to count the number of such choices that are consistent with the choices made
to fill the positions indexed byMi. Towards this end, we consider two cases:
1. Case 1: Mi ∩Mj = ∅. In this case, there is no overlap in the elements indexed byMi and
Mj and hence we can select all the available q choices for the positions indexed byMj;
2. Case 2: Mi ∩Mj 6= ∅. In this case, there is some overlap in the elements indexed byMi
and Mj . Thus, since we have already fixed the elements indexed by Mi, we do not have
any choice for the elements indexed byMj (since all the elements have to be the same).
By iterating the same reasoning as above for all i ∈ A, we conclude that we can fill all the positions
indexed by ∪i∈AMi of a vector x ∈ Ftq and make sure that x ∈ (∩i∈AVi) in qCA ways. This is
because, there are CA connected components, and for each of these components we have only q
choices to fill the corresponding positions in the vector x (i.e., the positions that correspond to the
relays to which at least one of the destinations inside that component is connected). Once we fix
any position inside a component, in fact all the other positions inside that component have to be the
same, and thus we have no more freedom in choosing the other positions. Moreover, the remaining
t − MA positions of x can be filled with any value in Fq and for this we have qt−MA possible
choices. Therefore, the number of vectors x ∈ Ftq that belong to (∩i∈AVi) is at most qCA+t−MA ,
which implies
∀A ⊆ [m], dim (∩i∈AVi) ≤ t−MA + CA.
This proves that the secure scheme in Section 2.5.1 achieves the rate region in Theorem 8. We now
illustrate our method of identifying vectors that belong to ∩i∈AVi through an example.
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Example 5: Let t = 8, m = 4,M1 = {1, 2},M2 = {3, 4},M3 = {4, 5, 6} andM4 = {7, 8}.
Let A = {2, 3, 4}. With this, we can construct Vi, i ∈ [4], as described in (2.11), where V T
consists of one row of 8 ones. We now want to count the number of vectors x ∈ F8q such that
x ∈ V2 ∩ V3 ∩ V4. We use the following iterative procedure:
1. For x to belong to V2 its elements in the 3rd and 4th positions have to be the same since
M2 = {3, 4}. Thus, we have q choices to fill the 3rd and 4th position.
2. For x to belong to V3, its elements in the 4th, 5th and 6th positions have to be the same since
M3 = {4, 5, 6}. However, the element in the 4th position has already been fixed in selecting
vectors that belong to V2. Thus, there is no further choice in filling the 5th and 6th positions.
3. For x to belong to V4, its elements in the 7th and 8th positions have to be the same since
M4 = {7, 8}. Since in the previous two steps, we have not filled yet the elements in these
positions, then we have q possible ways to fill the elements in the 7th and 8th positions.
4. Moreover, we can fill the elements in the 1st and 2nd positions of x in q2 possible ways.
With the above procedure we get that dim
(∩i∈{2,3,4}Vi) = 4, which is equal to the upper bound
that we computed in (2.17) for the same example. 
2.5.4 Secure capacity for m = 3, k arbitrary
In this section, we consider the case m = 3, and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 9. For a two-layer network with m = 3 destinations, the secure capacity region is given
by ∑
i∈A
Ri ≤MA − k, ∀A ⊆ [m]. (2.20)
Clearly, from our result in Theorem 2, the rate region in (2.20) is an outer bound on the secure
capacity region and can be equivalently written as∑
i∈A
Ri ≤ min
P : ⊔
Q∈P
Q=A
{∑
Q∈P
MQ − |P|k
}
, ∀A ⊆ [m],
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where P is a disjoint partition of A. We will now show that for every A ⊆ [m],
dim
(∑
i∈A
Ni
)
≥ min
P : ⊔
Q∈P
Q = A
{∑
Q∈P
MQ − |P|k
}
. (2.21)
We prove (2.21) by considering three different cases.
Case 1: |A| = 1, i.e., A = {i}. For this case, Vi in (2.11) has k + t −M{i} rows. In particular,
all these rows are linearly independent since: (i) the rows of V T are linearly independent as V is
a Vandermonde matrix, (ii) Ci is full row rank by construction, and (iii) any linear combination of
the rows of V T will have a weight of at least t− k+ 1 (from the Vandermonde property), whereas
any linear combination of the rows of Ci will have a weight of at most t−M{i} ≤ t−k. It therefore
follows that, ∀i ∈ [3], we have that
dim(Ni) = t− dim(Vi) = t− (k + t−M{i}) = M{i} − k,
where the first equality follows by using the rank-nullity theorem. Thus, (2.21) is satisfied.
Case 2: |A| = 2, i.e., A = {i, j}. For this case, ∀(i, j) ∈ [3]2, i 6= j, we have that
dim(Ni +Nj) = dim(Ni) + dim(Nj)− dim(Ni ∩Nj)
= M{i}+M{j}−2k−dim(Ni ∩Nj), (2.22)
where the second equality follows by using dim(Ni) derived in Case 1. Thus, we need to compute
dim(Ni ∩Nj). Note that, by definition, Ni ∩Nj is the right null space of
V ?ij =
Vi
Vj
 (2.11)=

V T
Ci
Cj
 =
V T
Cij
 ,
where the last equality follows by removing one copy of the common rows in Ci and Cj , i.e., Cij
is a matrix of dimension (t − M∩{i,j}) × t, with all unique rows. Using a similar argument as
in Case 1 (i.e., any vector in the span of V T has a minimum weight of t − k + 1 and any linear
combination of the rows of Cij will have a weight of at most t −M∩{i,j}), the number of linearly
independent rows of V ?ij is min{t, t−M∩{i,j} + k}. Thus,
dim(Ni ∩Nj) = t−min{t, t−M∩{i,j} + k}
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= max{0,M∩{i,j} − k} = [M∩{i,j} − k]+,
where the first equality follows from the rank-nullity theorem. We can now write dim(Ni + Nj)
from (2.22) as
dim(Ni +Nj) = min
{
M{i} +M{i} − 2k,M{i,j} − k
}
.
Thus, the condition in (2.21) is satisfied.
Case 3: A = {1, 2, 3}. For this case, we will compute dim(N1 +N2 +N3) as
dim(N1 +N2 +N3) = t− dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3). (2.23)
Towards this end, we would like to compute the number of linearly independent vectors x ∈ Ftq
that belong to V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3. We start by noting that, similar to the case k = 1, we have t−M{1,2,3}
degrees of freedom to fill the positions of x corresponding to [t] \ ∪i∈[3]Mi. We now select a
permutation (i, j, `) of (1, 2, 3). In order for x to belong to Vi, the positions of x corresponding
toMi can be filled with k degrees of freedom. This is because: (i) Ci in (2.11) has zeros in the
positions specified byMi, and (ii) V T has k rows. Then, to fill the positions of x specified byMj
so that x ∈ Vj , we have at most [k −M∩{i,j}]+ degrees of freedom. This is because the positions
of x corresponding toMi ∩Mj have already been fixed (when filling the positions of x specified
by Mi). Finally, to fill the positions of x corresponding to M` such that x ∈ V`, we have at
most [k −M∩{`,{i,j}}]+ degrees of freedom. This is because, the positions of x corresponding to
M` ∩ (Mi ∪Mj) are already fixed. Thus, we obtain
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) ≤ k + [k −M∩{i,j}]+
+ [k −M∩{`,{i,j}}]+ + t−M{1,2,3}.
In Appendix A.5, we further tighten the bound for the quantity dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) and show that,
when substituted in (2.23), it satisfies the condition in (2.21). This proves that the scheme described
in Section 2.5.1 securely achieves the rate region in Theorem 9.
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2.5.5 Secure capacity for arbitrary values of k and m
We here provide sufficient conditions for which the secure scheme in Section 2.5.1 is capacity
achieving for arbitrary values of k and m. In particular, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 10. The scheme in Section 2.5.1 achieves the secure capacity region of a two-layer network
with arbitrary values of k and m wheneverM∩{i,j} ≥ k for all (i, j) ∈ [m]2, i 6= j.
Proof. We can compute dim(∩i∈AVi) as follows
dim(∩i∈AVi)
(a)≤ k + [k −M∩{i1,i2}]+
+ [k −M∩{i3,{i1,i2}}]+ + . . .
+ [k −M∩{i|A|,{i1,i2,...,i|A|−1}}]+ + t−MA
(b)
= k + t−MA,
where (i1, i2, . . . , i|A|) represents a permutation of the elements of A and: (i) the inequality in
(a) follows by extending to arbitrary values of m the iterative algorithm proposed for Case 3 in
Section 2.5.4 to fill the vector x so that x ∈ ∩i∈AVi and (ii) the equality in (b) follows since
M∩{ij ,{i1,i2,...,ij−1}} ≥M∩{ij ,ij−1} ≥ k.
By using the property of dual spaces and the rank-nullity theorem, we obtain dim(
∑
i∈ANi) ≥
MA−k, which satisfies the condition in (2.21) ∀A ⊆ [m]. This concludes the proof of Lemma 10.
Example 6: An example of a two-layer network that satisfies the condition in Lemma 10 is char-
acterized by the following parameters (see Definition 4): t = 10,m = 4, k = 6,
M1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
M2 = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}
M3 = {1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}
M4 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10}.

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The results presented in this section provide the secure capacity region characterization for net-
works with: (i) arbitrary value m of destinations, and k = 1 edge eavesdropped by the adversary;
(ii) arbitrary value k of edges eavesdropped and m = 3 destinations; (iii) arbitrary values for k and
m under certain conditions on the min-cut capacities (see Lemma 10).
For arbitrary values of m and k for which the condition in Lemma 10 is not satisfied, we
performed numerical evaluations by randomly constructing two-layer networks and, for all the
cases we tried, we could not find any network for which the scheme is not optimal. In particular, in
our simulations, we considered up to m = 8 destinations and, for different choices of t and k, we
connected each destination to a randomly chosen set of relays. We constructed 100 such network
instances, and verified that the rate region achieved by our designed scheme given in Lemma 7
equals the outer bound in (2.1). This suggests that our designed scheme could indeed be optimal
for arbitrary values of m and k, and we conjecture this result to hold.
Conjecture 1. Consider a two-layer network with m destinations, where an adversary eavesdrops
any k edges of her choice. The secure capacity region is given by∑
i∈A
Ri ≤ |∪i∈AMi| − k, ∀A ⊆ [m],
whereMi ⊆ [t], i ∈ [m] denotes the destination connection sets.
2.5.6 Secure capacity scheme for arbitrary separable networks
In this section, we will first show that for any separable network, a corresponding two-layer net-
work can be created such that both networks have the same min-cut capacitiesMA for allA ⊆ [m].
We will then show that a secure scheme designed for a two-layer network can be converted to a
secure scheme for the corresponding separable network.
By Definition 3, a separable network G with m destinations, can be separated into 2m − 1
networks G ′J , J ⊆ [m],J 6= ∅ where G ′J has min-cut capacity M ′J to every subset of destinations
in J . To construct the corresponding two-layer network, we use the following iterative procedure:
1. We place the source node S in layer 0 of our network, and the m destination nodes Di, i ∈
[m], in layer 2 of our network;
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2. For each J ⊆ [m], we add M ′J relays in layer 1 of our network;
3. For each J ⊆ [m], we connect: (i) the source in layer 0 with all the added M ′J relays, and
(ii) all the added M ′J relays with the destinations Di, i ∈ J in layer 2.
By following the above procedure, it is not difficult to verify that, for each A ⊆ [m], the min-cut
capacity in the constructed two-layer network isMA as given in (2.3). As such, the new constructed
two-layer network has the same min-cut capacity MA of the corresponding separable network. In
what follows, we refer to the original separable network as parent separable network, and to the
corresponding two-layer network as child two-layer network.
We now show that a secure scheme designed for the child two-layer network can be leveraged
to build a secure scheme for the corresponding parent separable network. Towards this end, we
assume that we have a secure scheme for the child two-layer network, i.e., as described in (2.10)
in Section 2.5.1, we have
X =
[
M V
] W
K
 .
Recall that, as highlighted in Remark 1, even if we select a random matrix V˜ instead of the Van-
dermonde matrix V , with a high probability (close to 1 for large field size) we will have a secure
scheme for the child two-layer network.
To transform the above secure scheme into a secure scheme for the parent separable network,
we proceed as follows. On every graph G ′J in the parent separable network, we transmit (multicast)
the symbols that were transmitted in the child two-layer network from the source node S in layer
0 to the set of M ′J relays in layer 1 that were added when constructing the child two-layer network
for G ′J . Note that this multicast towards all destinationsDi, i ∈ J , is possible since G ′J has min-cut
capacity M ′J . With such a strategy, at the end of the transmissions every destination in the parent
separable graph still receives the same set of packets as it would have received in the child two-
layer network. Thus, all the destinations can still decode their respective messages. We now prove
that this scheme is also secure. Let Y be the collection of the symbols transmitted (multicast) on
the parent separable network, as described above. Since multicasting involves network coding, we
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have
Y =
[
G
]
X, (2.24)
where G is an encoding matrix of dimension |E| ×M[m], which can be constructed in O (m|E|3)
by using the multicasting scheme of [JSC05], which requires a finite field of dimension m. Thus,
Y =
[
G
] [
M V˜
] W
K

=
[
GM GV˜
] W
K
 .
From the security condition in Lemma 1, it follows that the scheme above is secure if we can show
that for any choice of G, there exists a V˜ such that V˜ is an MDS matrix (i.e., any k rows of V˜ are
linearly independent) and
rk
([
GM GV˜
]∣∣∣
Z
)
= rk
([
GV˜
]∣∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k. (2.25)
This is shown in Appendix A.6, where we prove that over a sufficiently large finite field, with high
probability a random choice of V˜ is an MDS matrix and satisfies the condition in (2.25).
2.6 Two-Phase scheme for networks with arbitrary topologies and arbitrary
number of destinations
We now propose the design of a secure transmission scheme for networks with arbitrary topolo-
gies and arbitrary number of destinations. This scheme consists of two phases, namely the key
generation phase (in which secret keys are generated between the source and the m destinations)
and the message sending phase (in which the message packets are first encoded using the secret
keys and then transmitted to the m destinations). In particular, this scheme is inspired by the work
in [CPF11], where it was shown that for multicast and single unicast connections, such a two-phase
scheme that separates over time the transmissions of keys and messages indeed achieves the secure
capacity. However, it turns out that this is no longer the case for multiple unicast sessions, as we
discuss in detail in the following.
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The achievable rate region of this two-phase scheme is presented in Theorem 11.
Theorem 11. Let (Rˆ1, Rˆ2, . . . , Rˆm) be an achievable rate m-tuple in the absence of the eaves-
dropper. Then, the rate m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) with
Ri = Rˆi
(
1− k
M
)
,∀i ∈ [m] , (2.26)
where M is the minimum min-cut capacity between the source and any destination, is securely
achievable in the presence of an adversary who eavesdrops any k edges of her choice.
Proof. Let M{i} be the min-cut capacity between the source and the destination Di with i ∈
[m]. We define M as the minimum among all these individual min-cut capacities, i.e., M =
mini∈[m]M{i}. Let (Rˆ1, Rˆ2, . . . , Rˆm) ∈ Rm be the rate m-tuple achieved in the absence of the
eavesdropper. We start by approximating this rate m-tuple with rational numbers; notice that this
is always possible since the set of rationals Q is dense in R. Since this rational rate m-tuple might
involve fractional flows on the edges, we replace each edge with T parallel edges. This number T
is chosen such that: (i) we achieve the rate m-tuple (TRˆ1, T Rˆ2, . . . , T Rˆm) over T network uses
of the original network, and (ii) every edge carries an integer flow. We denote this new network as
GT . In what follows, we describe our coding scheme and show that
(R1, R2, . . . , Rm)=
(
1− k
M
)
(Rˆ1, Rˆ2, . . . , Rˆm) (2.27)
is securely achievable. In particular, our scheme consists of two phases, and in each phase we use
the network GT . We also highlight that we allow the adversary to eavesdrop any Tk edges of GT . In
other words, at the i-th network use of the original network, with i ∈ [T ], we allow the adversary to
eavesdrop a set of k edges that might be different from those eavesdropped in the previous network
uses. We next describe the two phases of our scheme.
• Key generation. This first phase – in which secure keys are generated between the source and
the destinations – consists of k subphases. In each subphase, the source multicasts T (M−k)
random packets securely to all destinations. This is possible thanks to the secure network
coding result of [CY02], since the minimum min-cut capacity of GT is TM and Eve has
access to Tk edges. Thus, at the end of this phase, a total of Tk(M − k) secure keys are
generated and exchanged between the source and the m destinations.
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• Message sending. This phase consists of M − k subphases. We choose Tk packets out
of the Tk(M − k) securely shared (in the key generation phase) random packets. For each
choice of Tk packets, we convert the unsecure scheme achieving (TRˆ1, T Rˆ2, . . . , T Rˆm) to a
secure scheme achieving the same rate m-tuple. Towards this end, we expand the Tk shared
packets into
∑m
j=1 TRˆj packets using an MDS code matrix. With this, we have the same
number of random packets as the message packets. We then add the message packets with
the random packets and transmit them as it was done in the corresponding unsecure scheme
(i.e., in absence of the eavesdropper).
Proof of security. For each of the M − k subphases of the message sending phase, we denote by
Wi the TRˆi messages for Di, and define W as
W =

W1
W2
. . .
Wm

Moreover, we let K be the vector containing the Tk securely shared random packets. With this,
for each of the M − k subphases of the message sending phase, we can write the transmissions
over the network GT as
X =
[
Mus V
] W
K
 , (2.28)
where Mus is the encoding matrix used in absence of the eavesdropper and V is the Vandermonde
matrix of size
∑m
i=1 TRˆi× Tk. Because of the property of Vandermonde matrices, (2.28) satisfies
the security condition in Lemma 1, and hence the scheme above is secure.
Analysis of the achieved rate m-tuple. The secure scheme described above requires a total of M
subphases, where the first k subphases are from phase 1 (i.e., key generation) and the next M − k
subphases are from phase 2 (i.e., message sending). In particular, in the first k subphases, we
generate the secure keys and in the remaining M − k subphases, we securely transmit at rates of
(TRˆ1, T Rˆ2, . . . , T Rˆm). Thus, the achieved secure message rate (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) is
Rj =
M − k
M
Rˆj =
(
1− k
M
)
Rˆj, ∀j ∈ [m] . (2.29)
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This concludes the proof of Theorem 11.
It is worth noting that the capacity region in absence of the eavesdropper was determined
in [KM03, Theorem 9], and is given by
∑
i∈A
Ri ≤MA, ∀A ⊆ [m].
By leveraging this result and (2.26), we can therefore compute the rate region achieved by our
secure two-phase scheme, which is given in the next corollary.
Corollary 12. The achievable secure rate region of the two-phase scheme is given by
∑
i∈A
Ri ≤MA − k
(
MA
M
)
, ∀A ⊆ [m],
where M = min
i∈[m]
M{i}.
We now comment on the design complexity of this two-phase scheme and provide a trivial
upper bound on the field size.
Lemma 13. The complexity of designing the secure two-phase transmission scheme equalsO(m3|E|3).
Moreover, a field size of O(m+ |E|) suffices.
Proof. To design our two-phase scheme for a rate tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm), we need to use k sub-
phases for multicasting the keys and M − k sub-phases for routing the multi-commodity infor-
mation flow. Recall that M is the minimum of the min-cut capacities from the source to any
destination Di, i ∈ [m], and as such M can be found in O(m|E|2.5) [Vai89] by solving m linear
programs. The design of the deterministic matrix for multicasting the keys has a time complexity
ofO(|E|mM(M+m)) [JSC05], which can be further upper bounded asO(|E|3m). Finally, the de-
sign of the routing for multi-commodity flow can also be performed using a linear program which
has a time complexity of O((m|E|)2.5) [Vai89]. Thus, the overall time complexity is O(m3|E|3).
The field size required for constructing the deterministic multicast matrix is m [JSC05]. We
also require an MDS code for encoding the message packets before routing. This requires a field
size of |E| (corresponding to the Vandermonde or similar MDS matrix). Thus, a trivial bound on
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the field size requirement is O(m + |E|). However, since our encoding schemes are linear, we
believe that vector encoding schemes, such as the subspace coding scheme in [KSK09], could be
adapted to this case and leveraged to achieve a small finite field size. This is part of our current
investigation.
We conclude this section, by highlighting two fundamental features of our two-phase scheme:
1. Different from the scheme designed in Section 2.5, which only applies to separable networks,
the two-phase scheme applies to networks with arbitrary topologies.
2. The two-phase scheme is oblivious to the network structure, and uses all the network re-
sources in both phases. In other words, different from the optimal scheme of Section 2.4 for
m = 2 destinations, the two-phase scheme does not seek to optimally separate the informa-
tion and key flows. This causes the scheme to be sub-optimal (see also Corollary 12) as also
remarked by the detailed analysis in [ACF17, Section 4.3].
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CHAPTER 3
Millimeter Wave Networks (1-2-1 Networks)
High-frequency communication using millimeter waves employs beamforming to compensate for
the high path-loss and the high blockage. Although beamforming restricts the communication to
be in one direction, the additional degree of freedom in choosing the direction can make the secure
capacity arbitrary close to the unsecure capacity. We show this by designing an encryption scheme
that uses a time-varying selection of the network and does require any pre-shared key.
3.1 Summary
In this chapter, we consider a 1-2-1 network model and study its secure capacity. The 1-2-1 model
is the abstracted noiseless model of millimeter wave networks and has been shown to approxi-
mate the Gaussian capacity by Ezzeldin et al. [ECF18]. In this model, any two connected nodes
communicate by aligning their transmitting and receiving antenna known as beamforming.
Unlike the wireline network model, a node receiving different symbols on each of its incoming
edges and similarly transmitting different symbols on the outgoing links, is not possible in 1-2-1
network model due to the beamforming. Any node in the 1-2-1 network model can receive only
on one incoming edge and can also transmit only on one outgoing link. Our main observation is
that the choice in picking the direction to communicate helps in securing against an eavesdropper
without requiring any pre-shared key.
In this chapter, we characterize the secure capacity of unicast traffic against an eavesdropper,
using a time-varying selection of the network. We also derive sharp lower and upper bounds when
the source and the destination are assumed to have more than one antenna, and therefore, simulta-
neously transmitting and receiving on multiple edges. Finally, we characterize the secure capacity
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for a particular network topology called diamond networks where the edges can have arbitrary edge
capacities.
Organization: Section 3.2 formally describes the 1-2-1 network model and characterizes the un-
secure capacity for arbitrary network topology with unit edge capacities. Section 3.3 characterizes
the secure capacity results for arbitrary networks with unit edge capacities and provides sharp
bound when the source and the destination have multiple antennas. Section 3.4 presents the secure
capacity result for diamond networks with arbitrary edge capacities.
3.2 System model and unsecure capacity
The work in [ECF18] examined the unsecure capacity characterization of the Gaussian mmWave
network by modeling it as a 1-2-1 network. In [ECF18], it was shown that the capacity of a
Gaussian 1-2-1 network can be approximately characterized to within a constant gap by a lossless
1-2-1 network where the schedule does not depend on the transmitted messages in the network. In
this chapter, we examine security over such 1-2-1 networks, that we describe next.
We assume that each link in the graph G = (V , E) with edges of fixed finite capacities, can
be activated according to the 1-2-1 constraints. That is, at any particular time, an intermediate
node can simultaneously receive and transmit but it can at most listen to one node (one incoming
edge) and direct its transmission to one node (one outgoing edge) in the network. For the source
(respectively, destination) we allow it to transmit (respectively, receive from)m other nodes i.e., on
m outgoing edges (respectively, on m incoming edges), simultaneously with no interference. An
example with m = 2 antennas at the source and the destination is shown in Fig. 3.1. The Fig. 3.1a
depicts a valid network use whereas it is not possible to use the network as shown in Fig. 3.1b
since the intermediate node has to receive from two nodes and also has to transmit to two nodes at
a time.
Adversary model and security: We assume that the source wishes to communicate a message W
of entropy rate R securely from a passive external adversary Eve who can wiretap any k edges of
her choice. If Eve wiretaps edges in the set S ⊆ E , |S| = k, and the symbols transmitted on these
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𝑆 𝐷
(a) Valid use.
𝑆 𝐷
(b) Invalid use.
Figure 3.1: An example of network with 1-2-1 constraints.
edges over n network uses are denoted by {T ne , e ∈ S}, then we require that:
I(W ; {T ne , e ∈ S}) = 0, ∀S ⊆ E , |S| = k. (3.1)
We are interested in characterizing the secure message capacity C, that is the maximum rate at
which the source can communicate with the destination with zero error under (3.1).
Unsecure capacity: Here, we derive the capacity in the absence of the eavesdropper Eve. 1-2-1
networks with arbitrary edge capacities andm = 1, under Gaussian channel models were analyzed
in [ECF18], where the main result is that over such networks, one can approximately (i.e., up to a
gap that only depends on the number of nodes) achieve the capacity by routing information across
paths; moreover, out of an exponential number of paths that potentially connect the source to the
destination, capacity can be achieved by utilizing at most a linear number (in the number of nodes)
of them. In this section, we derive an additional result, namely the exact capacity for any m when
all the edges are of unit capacity.
Theorem 14. For arbitrary 1-2-1 networks with unit capacity edges, the capacity in absence of
any eavesdropper is given by,
Cu = min(m,Hv), (3.2)
where Hv is the maximum number of vertex disjoint paths.
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Proof. Achievability: Let p[Hv ] be the Hv vertex disjoint paths. These paths are of fundamental
importance under the 1-2-1 constraints. This is because intermediate nodes can transmit and re-
ceive from only one node each, and this ensures that multiple vertex disjoint paths (depending on
the number of source and destination beams) can be simultaneously operated at each time. We pick
min(m,Hv) such paths and use these for the transmission and thus achieve a rate of min(m,Hv).
Outer bound: Whenever there are direct edges from the source to the destination, we add a virtual
node in between, so that a direct edge turns into a two-hop path. This does not change the trans-
mission rate as if there was a transmission on the direct edge in G, it can also be performed using
the added virtual node with no extra resources. Thus, we can assume that there are no direct edges
from the source to the destination.
Now, we consider the minimum vertex cut of the network, i.e., the minimum number of ver-
tices (excluding the source and the destination), such that when we remove them there is no path
from the source to the destination. This minimum number of vertices is equal to the maximum
number of vertex disjoint paths, i.e., Hv. We denote these vertices as V1, V2, , . . . , VHv . Each of
these intermediate nodes can transmit only on one of its outgoing edges. We denote the symbols
transmitted on the outgoing edges of these nodes over n network uses as T nV[Hv ] , where T
n
Vi
denotes
the symbols transmitted by vertex Vi. We represent the symbols received by the destination as T nD.
By Fano’s inequality, we obtain
nR ≤ H(W )
(a)
= H(W )−H(W |T nD)
(b)
≤ H(W )−H(W |T nV[Hv ])
= I(W ;T nV[Hv ])
≤ H(T nV[Hv ])
(c)
≤ nHv, (3.3)
nR ≤ H(W )−H(W |T nD)
= I(W ;T nD) ≤ H(T nD)
(d)
≤ Hn, (3.4)
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where (a) is due to the reliable decoding constraint; (b) follows from the ‘conditioning does not
increase the entropy’ principle and since V[Hv ] is a vertex cut and thus all the information going
to the destination passes through these vertices (i.e., T nD is a deterministic function of T
n
V[Hv ]
); (c)
is because there are Hv symbols for every instance and there are n such instances; and (d) holds
because the destination can receive only on m incoming edges from m nodes.
3.3 Arbitrary networks with unit edge capacities
In this section, we prove lower and upper bounds on the secure capacity.
Theorem 15. Consider an arbitrary 1-2-1 network with unit capacity edges.
(a) Form = 1: IfHe is the maximum number of edge disjoint paths connecting the source to the
destination on the underlying graph, then the 1-2-1 secure capacity C can be lower bounded
as follows:
C ≥
(
1− k
He
)
. (3.5)
(b) For m > 1: If Hv is the maximum number of vertex disjoint paths connecting the source
to the destination on the underlying graph, then the 1-2-1 secure capacity C can be lower
bounded as follows:
C ≥ min(m,Hv)
(
1− k
Hv
)
. (3.6)
Proof. The main intuition behind the proof is that we can apply the optimal secure communication
scheme we would have used on the underlying graph if we did not have the 1-2-1 constraints, and
then use this scheme under the 1-2-1 constraints, as described in what follows.
(a) For m = 1: Let p[He] be the edge disjoint paths. We start by generating k uniform random
packets and make He linear combinations of these using an MDS code matrix of size k × He.
We denote these packets as X[He], and refer to them as “keys”. Any k of these combinations are
mutually independent. Next, we take He − k message packets, and add (i.e., encode) these with
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the first He − k random packets. In other words, after this coding operation we obtain
Ti =
 Wi +Xi if i ≤ He − k,Xi else,
where W[He−k] are message packets.
We use the networkHe times, and in each instance we use one of the paths from p[He]. Thus, we
would be able to communicate all encoded symbols inHe time instances. Moreover, the destination
will be able to cancel out the keys and thereby decode He − k messages, as there are k symbols
T[He−k+1:THe ], which are just independent combinations of the k random packets we started with.
Moreover, in each instance, Eve will receive a symbol if the edges she eavesdrops are part of
the path that is used in that particular instance. Since her k edges can at most be part of k paths,
Eve will receive at most k symbols, all of which are encoded with independent keys. Thus, the
scheme securely transmits He − k message packets in He uses of the network. Hence, we get a
rate R = He−k
He
= 1 − k
He
, which is precisely the one in (3.5). Note that security follows from the
security of the underlying scheme, that is a standard scheme for multipath security.
(b) For m > 1: Let p[Hv ] be the vertex disjoint paths. Again, the fact that paths are vertex disjoint
is crucial under the 1-2-1 constraints. This is because intermediate nodes can transmit and receive
from only one node each, and this ensures that min(m,Hv) paths can be simultaneously operated
at each time (note that having vertex disjoint paths is a sufficient but not a necessary condition).
Let mˆ = min(m,Hv). We start by generating k
(
Hv−1
mˆ−1
)
random packets and extend them to
mˆ
(
Hv
mˆ
)
packets using an MDS code matrix. Then, similar to the case m = 1, we take the first
mˆ
(
Hv
mˆ
) −K(Hv−1
mˆ−1
)
of these random packets and add (i.e., encode) them with the same amount of
message packets. More formally, if
{
Xi, i∈
[
mˆ
(
Hv
mˆ
)]}
are the random packets after the extension
using the MDS code matrix, and
{
Wi, i∈
[
mˆ
(
Hv
mˆ
)−k(Hv−1
mˆ−1
)]}
are the message packets, then
Ti =
 Xi +Wi if i ≤ mˆ
(
Hv
mˆ
)− k(Hv−1
mˆ−1
)
Xi else
.
We use this network
(
Hv
mˆ
)
times, and in each instance we use a different choice of mˆ paths to
communicate. It is not difficult to see that each of the k edges eavesdropped by the adversary will
intersect with
(
Hv−1
mˆ−1
)
such network uses. This is because, for a fixed choice of edge, there are
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(
Hv−1
mˆ−1
)
network instances where a symbol in carried via this edge. Hence, in total the adversary
will receive only k
(
Hv−1
mˆ−1
)
symbols, which are encoded with independent keys. The receiver, after
the
(
Hv
mˆ
)
network uses will be able to cancel out the keys. Thus, we can securely communicate
mˆ
(
Hv
mˆ
)− k(Hv−1
mˆ−1
)
over
(
Hv
mˆ
)
instances of the network, and achieve a rate R equal to
R =
mˆ
(
Hv
mˆ
)− k(Hv−1
mˆ−1
)(
Hv
mˆ
)
= mˆ− kmˆ
Hv
= min(m,Hv)
(
1− k
Hv
)
,
which is precisely the one in (3.6). This concludes the proof of Theorem 15.
Theorem 16. Let He be the maximum number of edge disjoint paths connecting the source to
the destination on the underlying directed graph, then the 1-2-1 secure capacity C can be upper
bounded as follows:
C ≤ min(m,He)
(
1− k
He
)
.
Proof. From the min-cut, max-flow theorem there are He edges such that, when removed, the
source gets disconnected from the destination. Let e1, e2, . . . , eHe denote these edges. Assume
that the network is used n times, and let T nei , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , He} be the symbols transmitted on
these He edges over n uses of the network. By denoting the symbols transmitted by the source on
n network instances by T nS , then,
nH ≥ H(T nS )
(a)
= H(T nS , {T nei , i ∈ [He]})
≥ H({T nei , i ∈ [He]}),
where (a) follows because {T nei , i ∈ [He]} is a deterministic function of T nS . Moreover,H({T nei , i ∈
[He]}) ≤ nHe. Thus,
H({T nei , i ∈ [He]}) ≤ min(nHe, nm). (3.7)
In the remaining part of the proof, we use the result in the following lemma.
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Lemma 17. ∀k, ` ∈ Z, 0 ≤ k ≤ `, ∃ S ⊂ [`], |S| = k, such that
H({Xi, i ∈ Sc}|{Xi, i ∈ S}) ≤ `− k
`
H(X[`]).
Proof. Assume for all choices of S ⊂ [`], |S| = k,
H({Xi, i ∈ Sc}|{Xi, i ∈ S}) > `− k
`
H(X[`]).
Then,
(
`
k
)
H(X[`])
(a)
=
∑
S⊂[`]
|S|=k
(H({Xi, i ∈ S}) +H({Xi, i ∈ Sc}|{Xi, i ∈ S}))
(b)
≥
∑
S⊂[`]
|S|=k
((∑
i∈S
H(Xi|{Xj, j < i})
)
+H({Xi, i ∈ Sc}|{Xi, i ∈ S})
)
(c)
=
(
`− 1
k − 1
)∑
i∈[`]
H(Xi|{Xj, j < i})
+ ∑
S⊂[`]
|S|=k
H({Xi, i ∈ Sc}|{Xi, i ∈ S})
(d)
=
(
`− 1
k − 1
)
H({Xi, i ∈ [`]}) +
∑
S⊂[`]
|S|=k
H({Xi, i ∈ Sc}|{Xi, i ∈ S})
(e)
>
(
`− 1
k − 1
)
H({Xi, i ∈ [`]}) +
∑
S⊂[`]
|S|=k
`− k
`
H({Xi, i ∈ [`]})
=
(
`− 1
k − 1
)
H({Xi, i ∈ [`]}) +
(
`
k
)
`− k
`
H({Xi, i ∈ [`]})
=
(
`
k
)(
k
`
H({Xi, i ∈ [`]}) + `− k
`
H({Xi, i ∈ [`]})
)
=
(
`
k
)
H({Xi, i ∈ [`]}),
and hence we get a contradiction. Here (a) is because there are
(
`
k
)
ways of breaking {Xi, i ∈ [`]}
into two sets of size k and ` − k, and then it follows from the chain rule of entropy; (b) follows
because for any S ⊂ [`], we can order {Xi, i ∈ S} according to their index, and then we use
the chain rule of entropy followed by the condition reduces entropy principle; (c) follows because
for each i ∈ [`], there will be (`−1
k−1
)
choices of S where this i will be part of S; (d) follows again
from the chain rule of entropy; and (e) follows because of the assumption in the proof that for all
choices of S ⊂ [`], |S| = k, H({Xi, i ∈ Sc}|{Xi, i ∈ S}) > `−k` H({Xi, i ∈ [`]}).
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For ` = He, we assume S = [k] ⊂ [He] in Lemma 17. Then, starting with Fano’s inequality,
we have
nR ≤ H(W ) = H(W )−H(W |{T nei , i ∈ [He]})
= I(W ; {T nei , i ∈ [He]})
= I(W ; {T nei , i ∈ [k]})+
I(W ; {T nei , i ∈ [He] \ [k]}|{T nei , i ∈ [k]})
(a)
= I(W ; {T nei , i ∈ [He] \ [k]}|{T nei , i ∈ [k]})
≤ H({T nei , i ∈ [He] \ [k]}|{T nei , i ∈ [k]})
(b)
≤ He − k
He
min(nHe, nm)
=⇒ R ≤ min(m,He)
(
1− k
He
)
,
where (a) follows since, for security, I(W ; {T nei , i ∈ [k]}) = 0 and (b) is because of Lemma 17
and (3.7). This concludes the proof of Theorem 16.
For some special cases, we can exactly characterize the capacity (i.e., the upper and lower
bounds previously derived coincide). In particular, these include:
• Networks where the number of edge disjoint paths is equal to the number of vertex disjoint
paths. For these networks, the capacity is given by C=min(m,He)(1− kHe ).
• For networks where the source and the destination have one transmit and one receive beam
each, i.e., m = 1. For these networks, the capacity is given by C = 1− k
He
.
We next provide two different network examples where:
• Example 7 where the upper bound is tight,
• Example 8 where the upper bound is not tight, but the lower bound is tight .
Example 7: In Fig. 3.2a, there are four edge disjoint paths from the source to the destination, i.e.,
He = 4. Assume that m = 2, i.e., both the source and the destination can transmit and receive
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𝑆 𝐷
(a)
𝑆 1 𝐷
2
(b)
Figure 3.2: Network example with He = 4 and m = 2. (a) The upper bound is tight. (b) The lower
bound is tight.
from two nodes and k = 1, i.e., Eve wiretaps any one edge of her choice. We refer to the paths in
Fig. 3.2a as p1, p2, p3 and p4, where they are ordered from top to bottom (and also represented
with different line patterns). To achieve the outer bound, one can first use p1 and p4 and then use p2
and p3 to communicate two symbols in each instance of network use. Thus, on two time instances,
one can communicate 4 messages (3 securely since k = 1). This gives a secure rate of 3
2
, which
matches the outer bound.
Example 8: Fig. 3.2b has also He = 4. However, for m = 2 and k = 1, it can be shown that
the secure capacity is 1, whereas our outer bound in Theorem 16 is 3
2
. In order to achieve a secure
rate of one, we can select two node disjoint paths (one through node 1 and the other through node
2) and use them to communicate. We next derive an outer bound for the network in Fig. 3.2b
that is tighter than the one in Theorem 16. Assume that, at any time instant t, node 1 transmits
symbol Y (t)1 (it can transmit only one symbol even though it has three outgoing edges) and node 2,
transmits Y (t)2 . Suppose that the network is used n times, then by Fano’s inequality,
nR ≤ H(W ) = H(W )−H
(
W |{Y (t)i , i ∈ [2], t ∈ [n]}
)
= I(W ; {Y (t)i , i ∈ [2], t ∈ [n]})
= I(W ; {Y (t)2 , t ∈ [n]})+
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I(W ; {Y (t)1 , t ∈ [n]}|{Y (t)2 , t ∈ [n]})
(a)
≤ n =⇒ R ≤ 1,
where (a) is because, if Eve wiretaps the edge outgoing from node 2, then I(W ; {Y (t)2 , t ∈ [n]}) =
0 and there are only n symbols in {Y (t)1 , t ∈ [n]}.
3.4 Diamond networks with different path capacities
For the N -relay diamond network (shown in Fig. 3.3) with unit edge capacities (Ci = 1,∀i), the
lower and upper bounds in Theorem 15 and Theorem 16 match (since all the N edge disjoint
paths are also vertex disjoint, namely He = Hv = N ), and thus the secure capacity equals C =
min(m,N)(1− k
N
).
𝑆
2
𝐷
5
𝑁
1
3
4
𝐶1 𝐶1
𝐶2
𝐶𝑁𝐶𝑁
𝐶2
Figure 3.3: Diamond network with different path capacities.
We next consider the case where the edges have non-uniform capacities and m = 1. In par-
ticular, we assume that for relay i ∈ [N ], both links connecting to the source and the destination
have capacity Ci, as depicted in Fig. 3.3. In general, even over traditional networks, the problem of
security over unequal capacity edges is everything but easily solvable [CHK13b]. The main reason
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is that we need to consider all possible subsets of edges that Eve may wiretap.
Theorem 18. For the diamond network with m = 1 and N relays as shown in Fig. 3.3, the secure
capacity equals
C = max
N∑
i=1
fi=1
fi≥0
 N∑
i=1
fi Ci − maxS⊆[N ]
|S|=k
∑
i∈S
fi Ci
 . (3.8)
Proof. Achievability: It is clear that we can transmit
N∑
i=1
fiCi symbols from the source to the
destination, by using for a fraction fi of time the path with capacity Ci. Thus, each of the N
outgoing edges from the source (and similarly each of the N incoming edges to the destination)
will carry f1C1, f2C2, . . . fNCN packets, respectively. The adversary, in the worst case wiretaps
k edges, which carry the maximum number of packets. Using a similar encryption scheme as we
designed in Section 3.3, ensures a secure rate
[
N∑
i=1
fiCi −maxS
∑
i∈S
fiCi
]
, where S ⊆ [N ], |S| = k.
By optimizing over the fi’s we get that the C in (3.8) is achievable.
Outer bound: Since m = 1, at any time instant, the source can transmit on at most one of
its N outgoing edges. We let {T teit , t ∈ [n]} be the symbols transmitted over n such instances,
where eit denotes the edge used in the t-th instance. Some of these symbols will flow through e1,
some through e2, and similarly some through eN , where ei is the edge of capacity Ci outgoing from
the source. Let Tei denote the symbols transmitted on ei in all such instances. Thus, {T teit , t ∈
[n]} = {Tei , i ∈ [N ]}. Let |Tei | = ni, i ∈ [N ] such that
∑
i
ni = n. Because of the edge capacity
constraints we have H(Tei) ≤ niCi, ∀i ∈ [N ]. Now, by Fano’s inequality,
nR ≤ H(W ) = H(W )−H(W |{T teit , t ∈ [n]})
= I(W ; {T teit , t ∈ [n]}) = I(W ; {Tei , i ∈ [N ]})
= I(W ; {Tei , i ∈ S})+I(W ; {Tei , i /∈ S}|{Tei , i ∈ S})
(a)
≤ min
S⊆[N ]
|S|=k
I(W ; {Tei , i /∈ S}|{Tei , i ∈ S})
≤ min
S⊆[N ]
|S|=k
H({Tei , i /∈ S}|{Tei , i ∈ S})
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≤ min
S⊆[N ]
|S|=k
∑
i/∈S
niCi
=
∑
i∈[N ]
niCi − maxS⊆[N ]
|S|=k
∑
i∈S
niCi
=⇒ R ≤
∑
i∈[N ]
fiCi − maxS⊆[N ]
|S|=k
∑
i∈S
fiCi,
where (a) follows from the security condition and the choice of S to have the tightest bound, and
fi =
ni∑
i∈[N ] ni
≥ 0,∑i∈[N ] fi = 1. Optimizing over all such choices of ni, i ∈ [N ], we get that C
in (3.8) is an outer bound on the secure capacity. This concludes the proof of Theorem 18.
𝑆 𝐷
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Figure 3.4: Diamond network for Example 9
Example 9: Consider a diamond network with N = 4, and C1 = 3, C2 = 2, C3 = 2 and C4 = 1
and assume k = 1 as shown in Fig. 3.4. If we were to use each path the same number of times, we
would get a secure rate of 5
4
. In contrast, the optimal scheme from Theorem 18 uses the first path
twice, the second and third three times each, and does not use the last path, achieving a secure rate
of 3
2
. Thus, we see that different from non 1-2-1 networks, here we might need to discard some of
the resources in order to get an optimal secure rate.
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CHAPTER 4
Distortion Based Security for Cyber-Physical Systems
Traditionally encryption schemes are designed to secure raw bits of the messages. However, when
the messages are embedded in a metric space having a notion of distance (for instance, sensor
measurements), securing raw bits might not be necessary and is an overkill. In fact, with just a
single bit of pre-shared key, a carefully designed encryption scheme can distort the eavesdropper’s
view significantly enough. In this chapter, we show this with an example of a linear dynamical
system that securely communicates its states in the presence of an eavesdropping adversary.
4.1 Summary
This chapter introduces a new framework called distortion based security for the communication
in cyber-physical systems (CPS) in the presence of an eavesdropping adversary. We argue that in
CPS, the notion of distortion based security is more appropriate and provides theoretical guarantees
with a minimal requirement on the pre-shared key. We show that it is possible to confuse the
eavesdropper with as little as just one bit of pre-shared key. In particular, we will show that a
linear dynamical system can communicate its state to a remote cloud in a manner that prevents an
eavesdropper from accurately learning the state.
The linear dynamical system considered in this chapter transmits its state at each time instance,
and thus communicates a co-related stream of messages. We identify two notions of distortion at
eavesdropper’s end and develop encryptions scheme towards maximizing the distortion for each
of these two notions. In particular, we define an average-case distortion measure and a worst-
case distortion measure. The average-case distortion measure considers an average distance of
adversary’s estimates of the state to the ground truth. Here, we average over the randomness in
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the message transmitted at each time instance and also average across the entire time horizon. On
the other hand, the notion of the worst-case distortion is a stronger metric where we consider the
closest the adversary comes to the ground truth among all time instances as the measure of security.
The main challenge in designing such encryption schemes is that the encrypted sequences
should also follow the same underlying system dynamics in order to not let the eavesdropper
separate out the fake transitions from the actual ones. Towards this, our encryption schemes hide
the actual state transitions in a set of state transitions, all following the same underlying system
dynamics yet having a maximal spatial separation.
For the notion of average-case distortion, our scheme does this by extending the idea of mir-
roring (illustrated in Chapter 2) to a more general light-weight mappings for dynamical systems in
higher dimensional spaces. For the worst-case distortion, the encryption scheme is more involved
and achieves a near-perfect distortion with 3 bits of the shared key per dimension (i.e., 9 bits of the
pre-shared key for a three-dimensional motion).
Organization: This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formally defines the problem,
and the two notions called the average-case distortion and the worst-case distortion. Section 4.3
and Section 4.5 discusses encryption schemes for these two notions, respectively. Section 4.4
describes transformations which maintain a symmetry - this symmetry is used to guarantee the
security of encryption schemes with just one bit of the pre-shared key.
4.2 System model
We consider a dynamical system interested in communicating its state transitions to a cloud against
an eavesdropping adversary as shown in Fig. 4.1. The linear dynamical system is described as,
X˜t+1 = AX˜t +BUt + wt,
Yt = CX˜t + vt, (4.1)
where X˜t ∈ Rn is the state of the system at time t ∈ [1 : N ] with N being the final time instance,
Ut ∈ Rm is the input to the system at time t, wt ∈ Rn is the process noise, Yt are the system
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Figure 4.1: Communication in cyber-physical systems.
observations, and vt ∈ Rp is the observation noise. We denote X˜N1 by X˜ , UN−11 by U and wN−11 by
w. Based on the initial state X˜1 and target state X˜N , the controller computes a sequence of inputs
that moves the state from initial state X˜1 to the target state X˜N in N time instances. We assume
that the system uses the observations Y N1 to optimally estimate the states X˜ . The optimal estimates
of X˜ made by the system are denoted by X – in the case of perfect observation, i.e., noiseless and
observable systems, then X = X˜ .
Communication and adversary models:
At each time instance the system (Alice) transmits information about its state estimate to a legiti-
mate receiver, which is referred to as Bob, via a noiseless link. This situation occurs for example
when Bob is remotely monitoring the execution of the system as in Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems or in the remote operation of drones.
A malicious receiver, referred to as Eve, is assumed to eavesdrop on the communication be-
tween the system and Bob and is able to receive all transmitted signals. The goal of Eve is to make
an estimate that is as close to X as possible: since Bob receives X and makes control decisions
with this information, Eve is interested in X . Eve is assumed to be passive: she does not actively
communicate but is interested in learning the system’s states from t = 1 to t = N . We assume
that the System and Bob have a k-bits long pre-shared key K which they use to encode/decode the
transmitted messages.
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Inputs and states random process model:
We assume that both receivers are only aware of the system model, the matrices A,B,C and the
statistics of noises. Therefore, from the perspective of the receivers, the input and output sequences
have random distributions which depend on A,B,C and the statistics of the noise. In addition to
the process noise w, the joint distribution f(X,U,w) depends on (i) the initial and target states, (ii)
the control law of the system, and (iii) the state estimation process. So, even in noiseless systems,
X and U possess inherent randomness from a receiver’s perspective due to its lack of knowledge
about the initial and target states.
Encoding model:
The system encodes and transmits packets ZN1 to ensure that Bob is able to accurately receive X
N
1 ,
the optimal estimates of the system. To do so, the system transmits a packet Zt at each time step t.
In this work, we use light-weight memoryless encryption schemes. The t-th transmitted packet is
a function of only the current state estimate and the pre-shared key, thus, Zt := Et(Xt, K), where
Et is the encoding function used at time t. We will denote ZN1 by Z.
Bob/Eve models of decoding:
Bob noiselessly receives the transmitted packets from the system, and decodes them using the pre-
shared key. Then, using the decoded information, it generates an estimate of the state of the system
at times t ∈ [N ]. We require that Bob’s estimate is as accurate as Alice’s. If we assume that, at
time t ∈ [N ], Bob’s decoding function is Γt (Zt1, K), then the previous condition is satisfied by
ensuring that Γt (Zt1, K) = Xt for all t ∈ [N ]. Similarly, Eve also receives all transmissions from
the system. However, unlike Bob, she does not have the key K. Therefore, Eve’s estimate of Xt is
Xˆt := φt
(
ZN1
)
, t ∈ [N ], where φt is the decoding function used by Eve at time t.
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Distortion metrics:
We consider a distortion-based security metric which captures how far an estimate is from the
actual value. In particular, our analysis is based on the Euclidean distance as our distance metric.
However, our analysis can be extended to any p-norm, since other norms are just a constant factor
away, i.e., ‖X‖p ≤ n
1
p
− 1
q ‖X‖q. We assess the performance of Eve as how far its estimate Xˆ , is
from Alice’s estimate X . Formally, for a given time instance t and a transmitted codeword ZN1 , we
define the following quantity,
D(t, ZN1 ) := EXt|ZN1
∥∥∥Xt − Xˆt∥∥∥2 (a)= tr(RXt|ZN1 ) , (4.2)
where (4.2) captures the distortion incurred by Eve while estimating Xt for transmitted symbols
ZN1 . Equality in (a) follows because the best (minimizing) estimates of Eve at time t are,
Xˆt = φt
(
ZN1
)
= E
[
Xt|ZN1
]
.
Note that Bob is required to successfully estimate Xt knowing Zt1 and the key. Therefore, for a
given realization of the key, the encoding function can only map one Xt and that key realization
to each value of ZN1 . Therefore Eve realizes that only trajectories from a particular subset can be
the true trajectory for a given ZN1 : those are the ones which correspond to each key realization.
Therefore, the expectation in (4.2) is in fact taken over the randomness in the key taking into
account posterior probabilities given ZN1 . If Eve does not have observations, the expectation is
taken over Xt with prior distribution and we get D(t, ZN1 ) = tr(RXt).
As D(t, ZN1 ) is a function of time t and the transmitted sequence Z
N
1 , we consider two overall
distortion metrics: the “average case” distortion (denoted by DE) where we take expectation over
all possible ZN1 and average out over time; and the “worst-case” distortion (denoted byDW ) where
we take minimum over all possible ZN1 and time instances.
(Average-case distortion) DE := EZN1
[
1
N
N∑
t=1
D(t, ZN1 )
]
(4.3)
(Worst-case distortion) DW := min
ZN1
[
min
t∈[N ]
D(t, ZN1 )
]
. (4.4)
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It is worth to note that the definitions of DE and DW in (4.3) and (4.4) imply that Eve’s state
estimation must be associated to a time instance. In other words, making a random/constant esti-
mate of the state hoping that it matches the actual state at some time will lead to high distortion
values. Further, DW can be defined even when there is no prior distribution on XN1 . However, to
provide a baseline comparison with the case when the adversary has no observations, we assume
that XN1 always have a known prior distribution.
Design goals:
Our goal is to choose the encoding and decoding functions, Et and φt, so that Bob can decode
loselessly while the distortion is maximized for Eve’s estimate. In addition, we seek to achieve
this with the minimum length of the pre-shared key K. In absence of any observation by Eve,
these distortions will be,
DmaxE =
1
N
N∑
t=1
tr(RXt),
DmaxW = min
t∈[N ]
tr(RXt).
These will serve as upper bounds as,
DE =
1
N
EZN1
N∑
t=1
tr(RXt|ZN1 )
(a)
≤ 1
N
N∑
t=1
tr(RXt)
= DmaxE , (4.5)
DW = min
ZN1
min
t∈[N ]
tr(RXt|ZN1 )
≤ min
t∈[N ]
EZN1
[
tr(RXt|ZN1 )
]
(b)
≤ min
t∈[N ]
tr(RXt)
= DmaxW , (4.6)
where (a) and (b) follows by noting that the trace of the conditional covariance matrix is a quadratic
(convex) function in ZN1 and therefore we can use Jensen’s inequality.
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4.3 Optimizing average-case distortion DE
In this section, we will discuss schemes to optimize the average-case distortion (DE). We will
analyze encoding schemes which use one bit of the pre-shared key, and characterize their attained
level of distortion. We then show that such schemes attain the maximum level of distortion for a
family of distributions on X which exhibit a certain class of symmetry.
We now discuss encoding schemes that use one bit of the pre-shared key and show how the
achieved distortion compares to the upper bound in (4.5). These encoding schemes work as fol-
lows:
Zt =
 Xt if K = 0,αt(Xt) if K = 1, ∀t ∈ [N ], (4.7)
where K ∈ {0, 1} is the shared bit and αt(Xt) is a transformation of the state vector Xt. We
denote by α−1t (Xt) the inverse transformation of αt. We will next show the attained distortion of
such schemes.
Theorem 19 (Proof in Appendix A.7). The average-case distortion (DE) attained by using the
scheme in (4.7) is,
1
2N
N∑
t=1
EX
{
fX(α
−1(X))
fX(X) + fX(α−1(X))
∥∥Xt − α−1t (Xt)∥∥2} , (4.8)
where α−1(X) := [(α1(X1))T , (α2(X2))T , · · · (αN(XN))T ]T . Moreover, if the following condition
holds,
fX(x) = fX(α
−1(x)), ∀x ∈ X , (4.9)
then the expression simplifies to
DE =
1
4N
N∑
t=1
EX ‖Xt − αt(Xt)‖2 . (4.10)
Condition (4.9) implies a general notion of symmetry in the distribution of fX(x). In the
following, we focus on a particular notion of distribution symmetry, for which we show the corre-
sponding choice of αt(Xt) and how it can achieve high levels of distortion. Consider a transfor-
mation function αt(x) which reflects a point x across an affine subspace of dimension d, defined
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by the equations Stx = bt where St ∈ Rd×n consists of d ≤ n orthonormal rows, and bt ∈ Rd; the
transformation is αt(x) =
(
I − 2(St)TSt
)
x + 2(St)
T bt. The choice of the dimension d and the
subspace (St, bt) depend on the properties we would like the encoded trajectories to have. We refer
to encoding schemes that are based on this transformation as mirroring schemes. For example,
consider Xt ∈ R2 where St = 1√2 [−1, 1] and bt = 0. Then αt(Xt) corresponds to mirroring across
a line that passes through the origin with a 45◦ angle. This is shown in Fig. 4.2. We are inter-
ested in mirroring schemes as they are light-weight and can be implemented on low-complexity
IoT devices. Moreover, such schemes can provide the maximum distortion level for a class of
distributions with what we refer to as point-symmetry.
Definition 5 (Point symmetry). A random vector X is said to have point symmetry if there exists
a point v for which fX(x) = fX(2v − x), ∀x ∈ X .
Lemma 20. If X has point symmetry across v, then v = µX .
Proof. Since X has point symmetry, then
fX(x) = fX(2v − x)
⇒ fX(x) = f2v−X(x)
⇒ µX = 2v − µX
⇒ µX = v.
The following result characterizes the performance of the mirroring scheme, and shows that it
achieves the maximum distortion for distributions with point symmetry.
Corollary 21. If αt(Xt) is based on a mirroring scheme along the planes given by Stx = bt, t ∈
[N ] and the condition (4.9) holds, then (4.10) becomes,
DE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
tr
(
StRXt(St)
T + (bt − StµXt)(bt − StµXt)T
)
. (4.11)
Moreover, if X has point-symmetry, then DE = 1N
N∑
t=1
tr(RXt), the maximum possible distortion.
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Figure 4.2: Mirroring across the line passing through the origin at 45◦ angle with the X-axis.
Proof. If condition (4.9) holds, then by simply plugging the expression of αt(Xt) for the mirroring
scheme along Stx = bt that is αt(Xt) =
(
I − 2(St)TSt
)
x + 2(St)
T bt in (4.10) we get (4.11)
(Formal proof in Appendix A.7). Choosing St = I and bt = µxt makes α−1(XN1 ) = 2µXN1 −XN1
which by point-symmetry satisfies (4.9). Therefore, we get DE = 1
N
N∑
t=1
tr(RXt).
Now, we show the implications of our results for mirroring based schemes in the context of a
few examples.
Example 10: Consider an example where U is distributed as Gaussian with mean µU and covari-
ance matrixRU . Then for a noiseless system with perfect observation and a zero initial state,XN2 is
also Gaussian distributed. A Gaussian random vector has point-symmetry and therefore, according
to Corollary 21, we can get maximum distortion by setting bt = µXt and St = I .
The next example is based on a Markov-based model for the dynamical system. For this exam-
ple, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 22. Consider the random vector XN1 where the following conditions hold: 1) fX1(x1)
has point-symmetry, and 2) fXt|Xt−11 (xt|x
t−1
1 ) has point-symmetry, then so does fX(X), where
X = XN1 and µX = [(µX1)
T , (µX2)
T , · · · , (µXN )T ]T . Therefore, by virtue of Corollary 21,
mirroring schemes can achieve the maximum distortion.
Lemma 22 allows us to characterize the performance of the following example.
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Example 11: Consider the following random walk mobility model. Let a ∈ N+, and Xt be its
location at time t, then,
X1 ∼ Uni([−a : a]),
Xt|Xt−1 ∼ Uni([−a : a] ∩ {Xt−1 − 1, Xt−1, Xt−1 + 1}).
One can see that these distributions satisfy the conditions in Lemma 22. Therefore, one can set
bt = µt = 0 and St = 1, which will achieve maximum distortion of DE .
Example 12: Here we provide a numerical example which shows how our mirroring scheme
performs for situations where we compute the state distributions using numerical simulations. In
the Section 4.4, we will also show that the controller used in this example falls under the class of
controller where we do not need to compute the distribution on states and can directly apply our
scheme to achieve the perfect distortion. We consider the quadrotor dynamical system provided
in (4) of [KM12]. The quadrotor moves in a 3-dimensional cubed space with a width, length
and height of 2 meters, where the origin is the center point of the space. The quadrotor starts its
trajectory from an initial point (−1, y1, z1) and finishes its trajectory at a target point (1, yN , zN)
after N time steps, where the points y1, z1, yN , zN are picked uniformly at random in [−1, 1]4.
We assume that N = 10 time steps, and that the continuous model in [KM12, (4)] is discretized
with a sample time of Ns = 0.5 seconds. We assume that the quadrotor encodes and transmits
only the states which contain the location information (first three elements of the state vector Xt).
The quadrotor is equipped with an LQR controller which designs the input sequence UN−11 as the
solution of the following problem
minimize ‖U‖2 + 10 ∥∥XN−12 ∥∥2
subject to Xt+1 = AquadXt +BquadUt, ∀t ∈ [N − 1]
X1 =
[
−1 y1 z1 0 · · · 0
]T
,
XN =
[
1 yN zN 0 · · · 0
]T
,
(4.12)
where Aquad and Bquad define the quadrotor’s discrete-time model. The remaining states of X1 and
XN are set to zero to allow the drone to hover at the respective locations. We perform numerical
simulation of the aforementioned setup: we run 2 millions iterations, where in each iteration a new
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Figure 4.3: An illustration of some trajectories. The reflection plane is shown as a dashed-black
line. One trajectory (solid-black) is shown along with its mirrored image (dotted-black).
initial and target points are picked, and the resultant trajectory is recorded. Based on the recorded
data, we consider different mirroring schemes and numerically evaluate the attained distortion.
To facilitate numerical evaluations, the simulation space is gridded into bins with 0.2 meters of
separation, and the location of the drone is approximated to the nearest space bin. Figure 4.3
shows some of the drone trajectories obtained from our numerical simulation. It is clear that not
all trajectories are equiprobable, and therefore the distribution of Xt is not uniform across all bins
in space. Since the motion of the drone is mainly progressive in the positive x-axis direction,
reflection across a fixed point results in mirrored trajectories that are progressing in the opposite
direction, and therefore are identified to be fake automatically. Therefore, mirroring across a point
here is useless: the numerically computed distortion for this scheme is equal to zero.
Next we consider mirroring across the reflection plane shown in Figure 4.3, where bt = 0 and
St =
0 1 0
0 0 1
 .
As can be seen from the figure, the reflection plane is indeed an axis of symmetry for the dis-
tribution of the drones trajectories, and therefore is expected to provide high distortion values.
We numerically evaluate the attained distortion using the scheme by using equation (4.8), which
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evaluates to DE = 0.3971. This is slightly less than DmaxE = 0.3979.
4.4 Transformations maintaining point symmetry
Encoding and decoding schemes such as the ones mentioned in Section 4.3 can be generally used
for any dynamical system with arbitrary distributions on the inputs U , the state vectors X˜t and the
state estimates Xt. However, characterizing the attained level of average distortion (using expres-
sions (4.8)) requires the knowledge of the distribution of the state estimate. While a distribution
can be obtained for the initial and target state vectors, it may be difficult to incorporate the system
dynamics, the estimation method as well as the controller into the process of finding a distribution
of the inputs, states and states estimate. In such cases, numerical evaluations can aid into finding
the needed distribution, as was shown in Example 12 in Section 4.3. Although it is necessary to
find the state distribution in order to characterize the distortion, the knowledge of existing sym-
metries in the distribution can directly give possible choices for the transformation function αt(·)
which may attain high levels of distortion; for example, if there is a point symmetry in the dis-
tribution, mirroring across the symmetry point attains the maximum possible distortion. In this
section, we ask the following question: “under which conditions on the dynamical system, does
point symmetry in the initial and target states results into point symmetry on the states estimate?”
A general answer to the aforementioned question appears to be difficult. Therefore, we limit
our answer in this work to the scope of linear controllers. or a given initial and target state, let
X(ref) be the reference trajectory that the control system ideally wishes to follow. We assume that
the system controller selects an input vector that is a linear function of X(ref). In many cases,
X(ref) is also a linear function of the initial and target states (e.g., when the reference trajectory
is the solution of an LQR problem for the noiseless version of the system). Then we can write
Ut = Kt
(
Xt −X(ref)t
)
. Moreover, we assume that the optimal estimation function that the system
uses is a linear one in the observations, i.e., we assume Xt is a linear function of Y t1 , Xinit and
Xtarget. By incorporating the controller and estimation equations into the system dynamics, one can
arrive at the following relation X = MQ, where Q =
[
(Xinit)
T , (Xtarget)
T , (wN1 )
T , (vN1 )
T
]T , and
the matrixM is a function of the matricesA,B,C,Kt and the linear function used in the estimation
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of state Xt from the observations. We assume that wN1 and v
N
1 are uncorrelated Gaussian random
vectors. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 23. If a random vector V1 ∈ Rn has point-symmetry across µV1 , and g is an affine function,
then the random vector V2 = g(V1) has point-symmetry across g(µV1).
Proof. If V1 has point-symmetry, then the following conditions are equivalent:
fV1(v1) = fV1(2µV1 − v1), ∀v1 ∈ V1,
fV1(v1) = f2µV1−V1(v1), ∀v1 ∈ V1.
Thus, to prove that V2 also has point-symmetry, it suffices to prove that the density of V2 and
2µV2−V2 is the same. Consider the two random vectors W1 and W2. If they have the same support
and the same density function, then g(W1) and g(W2) will also have the same density for any
function g; we denote this by writing W1 ∼ W2. Thus,
V1 ∼ 2µV1 − V1
g(V1) ∼ g(2µV1 − V1)
M1V1 +M2 ∼ 2M1µV1 −M1V1 +M2
V2 ∼ 2(M1µV1 +M2)− (M1V1 +M2)
V2 ∼ 2(µV2)− V2.
Thus, V2 has a point of symmetry.
Theorem 24. If Xinit and Xtarget are independent of wN1 and vN1 , and both have point symmetries,
then the vectors Xt as well as X will all have Point Symmetries for any matrix M .
Proof. First, note that wN1 and v
N
1 are Gaussian random vectors, and therefore have point symme-
tries across their mean points. SinceXinit andXtarget are independent of wN1 and v
N
1 , then the vector
Q =
[
(Xinit)
T , (Xtarget)
T , (wN1 )
T , (vN1 )
T
]T also has a point-symmetry across the mean point (which
is the concatenation of the mean points of the respective components of Q); we denote this point
by µQ. Then, by virtue of Lemma 23, X (respectively Xt) will also have point-symmetry across
the point MµQ (respectively across the point µQ left-multiplied by the corresponding section of
the matrix M ).
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Revisiting Example 12 of Section 4.3: Example 12 in Section 4.3 shows an example where the
initial and target points exhibit point-symmetry. In such an example, the LQR controller is a linear
function of the previous states (one can find such a controller by applying the KKT conditions).
Since the system is noiseless, then the estimated states are equal to the observations. Therefore,
the conditions for Theorem 24 are met, and point-symmetry is preserved for Xt and the whole
trajectory X . Note, however, that the point of symmetry for Xt changes with t, i.e., it progresses
along the x axis as shown in Figure 4.3.
4.5 Optimizing the worst-case distortion DW
The expected distortion metric might not be well-suited for some applications (for example if an
adversary wants to shoot a drone). In this case, the adversary’s estimate needs to be far from the
actual state at all time instances. Therefore, a more appropriate metric would be to consider the
worst-case distortion for the adversary. Consider for example the scheme in Fig. 1.4b. Here, the
adversary’s estimate is always the center point and therefore the maximum expected distortion is
achieved. However, when the drone is close to the center, its mirror image will also be close to the
center. At this particular time instance, the adversary’s distortion will be very small and thus the
adversary will essentially know the position.
In this section, we present an encryption scheme that attempts to maximize the worst-case
distortion for Eve. The main idea is to obfuscate the initial state in such a way that Eve, even if
she optimally uses her knowledge about the dynamics and her observations, her best estimate is
close to the maximal distortion. We start by studying the problem of distorting the transmission of
a single random variable in Theorems 26 and 27. These results then form the basis for maximizing
the worst-case distortion of a trajectory, as described in Theorem 28.
4.5.1 Building step: scalar case:
Consider the case where the system wants to communicate a single scalar random variable X to
Bob by transmitting Z. The worst-case distortion DW for Eve will be DW = minZ Var(X|Z).
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Note that if Eve does not overhear Z, Eve uses the minimum mean square error estimate, (i.e., the
mean value) as her estimate, and thus experience a worst-case distortion equal to the var(X).
We first assume that X ∼ N (0, 1), and thus, the worst-case distortion can not be larger than 1
by (4.6). We next develop our scheme progressively, from simple to more sophisticated steps. We
will also use the following lemma.
Lemma 25. The variance of two real numbers a and b with probabilities pa and pb is given by
papb(a− b)2.
Mirroring: Reflecting around the origin (as we did for optimizing the average case distortion
in Section 4.3) does not work well when X takes small values: indeed Var(X|Z) is Pr(X =
Z|Z)(Pr(X=−Z|Z))(Z − (−Z))2 using Lemma 25 and has a worst-case value that goes to zero
as Z approaches zero.
Shifting: To avoid this, we could try to use a “shifting” scheme where we add a constant θ to X
whenever the shared key bit is one; but now this scheme does not perform well for large values of
Z: as Z increases Var(X|Z) goes to zero. This is because using Lemma 25:
Var(X|Z) = Pr(X=Z|Z)(Pr(X=Z−θ|Z))(Z−(Z−θ))2
= Pr(X = Z|Z)(Pr(X = Z − θ|Z))(θ)2,
and Pr(X = Z|Z)(Pr(X = Z − θ|Z)) goes to zero for large value of Z.
Shifting+Mirroring: We here combine shifting and mirroring, in order to achieve a good perfor-
mance for both small and large values of X . We start from the case where we have k = 1 bit of
the pre-shared key and then go to the case k ≥ 1.
• k = 1. We select a θ1 ∈ R that determines a window size (θ1 is public and known by Eve). The
encoding function is
Z = E(X,K) =

X if K = 0
−X if K = 1, |X| > θ1
X + θ1 if K = 1, −θ1 ≤ X < 0
X − θ1 if K = 1, 0 ≤ X < θ1
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We note that there is one particular value of X , X = θ1, which we do not transmit. Since this is of
zero probability measure, it can be safely ignored. Given Z, there are two possibilities for X:
X ∈

{Z,−Z} if |Z| > θ1
{Z,Z + θ1} if − θ1 ≤ Z < 0
{Z,Z − θ1} if 0 ≤ Z < θ1.
Using the fact that X ∼ N (0, 1), we can calculate the posterior probabilities Pr(X|Z) and use
Figure 4.4: Var(X|Z) Vs Z for shifting+mirroring based scheme with θ1 = 1.76; DW = 0.4477.
Lemma 25 to compute Var(X|Z). Fig. 4.4 plots Var(X|Z) for θ1 = 1.76. The worst-case distortion
in this case becomes 0.4477, which is the best we can hope for if we have only one bit of the pre-
shared key. This follows because for any mapping from X to Z, a transmitted symbol Z can have
at most two pre-images (as Bob needs to reliably decode with the one bit of the pre-shared key),
and if one of these is X = 0, then no matter what the second one is, the distortion corresponding
to Z will be at most 0.4477. Equality occurs when the second pre-image of Z is ±1.76. Note that
our scheme also maps 0 to −1.76 (for θ1 = 1.76).
• k ≥ 1. For K ∈ {0, 1}k, we use the following encoding:
Z = E(X,K) (4.13)
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=
 X if Kd < 2k−1−X if Kd ≥ 2k−1 |X| > θk
X +Kd
2θk
2k
mod [−θk, θk) X ∈ [−θk, θk),
where the optimal value of the constant θk depends on the length k of the key K we have, Kd
is the decimal equivalent of K, and r mod [a, b) = r − i(b − a) is such that i is an integer and
r − i(b − a) ∈ [a, b) for r, a, b ∈ R. Intuitively, if |X| > θk then for half of the times, we reflect
across origin and for other half we do nothing; if |X| < θk, we divide this window of size 2θk into
2k equal size windows and shift a point from one window to another by jumping Kd windows. An
example for k = 2 is shown in Fig. 4.5a for the key values K = 11 and K = 10. Fig. 4.5b plots
DW as a function of the length k of the pre-shared key K. Using k = 3 and θ3 = 4.84 we achieve
DW = 0.9998 which is very close to 1, the best we can hope for.
0 𝜃2−𝜃2
0 𝜃2−𝜃2
0 𝜃2−𝜃2
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Figure 4.5: (a) Scheme for k = 2: Transparent shapes are true values and solid shapes represent
their respective mapping. (b) DW with the length k of the pre-shared key K for the optimal choice
of θk.
Theorem 26. A Gaussian random variable with mean µ and variance σ2 can be near perfectly
(∼ 0.9998 times the perfect distortion) distorted in worst-case settings by just using three bits of
the pre-shared key.
Proof. Generate the random variable V ∼ N (0, 1) as V = (X − µ)/σ and encrypt it using k = 3
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key bits and the previously described scheme. For c = 0.9998 we have
DW = min
Z
Var(X|Z) = min
Z
Var(σV + µ|Z) = σ2 min
Z
Var(V |Z) = cσ2.
4.5.2 Vector case and time series
Theorem 27 (Proof in Appendix A.8). For a Gaussian random vector X ∈ Rn with mean µ and
a diagonal covariance matrix Σ we can achieve DW within 0.9998 of the optimal by using 3n bits
of the pre-shared key.
This theorem uses our 3-bit encryption for each element in the vector. Assume now that this
vector captures the probability distribution of the initial state of dynamical system; by encrypting
this state we can guarantee the following.
Theorem 28 (Complete Proof in Appendix A.9). Using 3n bits of the pre-shared key we can
achieve DW within 0.9998 of the optimal for the dynamical systems (4.1) with C = I , vt = 0,
singular values of A having absolute value larger than 1, and initial state X1 ∼ N (µ,Σ), where
Σ is diagonal covariance matrix, and Ut and wt are independent of Xt.
Remark: Although the independence assumption on the inputs is rather restrictive, the result
serves as a stepping stone towards understanding general cases.
Proof. The system transmits Z1 = f(Y1, K) = f(X1, K) where f is the encoding in Theorem 27,
and for t ∈ [N − 1],
Zt+1 = AZt + (Yt+1 − AYt) = AZt +BUt + wt.
Bob can decode X1 using Z1 and K. Then:
Xˆt+1 = Zt+1 − AZt + AXˆt
= (AZt +BUt + wt)− AZt + AXˆt
= AXt +BUt + wt = Xt+1, ∀t ∈ [N − 1].
Eve’s distortion is calculated in the Appendix A.9.
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CHAPTER 5
Discussion and Open Directions
In this thesis, we studied three different scenarios of communication in the presence of eavesdrop-
ping adversaries. In each of these scenarios, we designed communication schemes requiring either
no or a small pre-shared key. However, there are still open problems in each of these scenarios;
which we discuss in what follows.
Multiple unicast traffic over wireline networks: We designed a scheme that is capacity-
achieving for several different cases, namely: (i) arbitrary networks with two destinations; (ii)
arbitrary separable networks with three destinations; and (iii) arbitrary separable networks where
only one edge is eavesdropped. However, proving Conjecture 1, which claims the scheme to be
capacity achieving for arbitrary separable networks remains open. The capacity characterization
for networks which are not separable also remains open.
Characterizing the maximum information flow for networks with an arbitrary number of sources
and destinations is a long standing open problem. For secure capacity, its connection to the edge
removal problem has also been explored in the information theory literature but it remains largely
open for networks with an arbitrary number of sources and destinations [LLE13].
Millimeter wave networks (1-2-1 networks): We derived upper and lower bounds on the
secure capacity of 1-2-1 networks where all nodes, except the source and the destination, have only
one transmitting and one receiving antenna. However, the exact secure capacity characterization
remains open. Moreover, secure capacity characterization for multicast and multiple unicast traffic,
and also the case of non-uniform edge capacities remain open.
Practical problems in steering antenna arrays and their alignments with the receiver’s beam
have associated costs, and an analysis with these costs would be an interesting future work.
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Distortion based security for cyber-physical systems: For the average-case distortion, we de-
signed a scheme that for several distributions having a point symmetry, distorts the eavesdropper’s
view with just one bit of shared key. However, designing schemes for other general distributions
remains open. For the worst-case distortion, our scheme assumes an open loop controller and a
Gaussian distribution on the initial state. Designing schemes tailored for the worst-case distortion
without these assumptions remains open.
Moreover, identifying applications specific distortion measures and developing encryption schemes
tailored towards them remain open in general. Theoretical analysis of the security aspect of these
schemes when eavesdroppers might obtain additional side information is also an important direc-
tion for future work.
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APPENDIX A
Appendices
A.1 Proof of security: Theorem 3, case 1
We here prove that, for any choice of G, there exists a U in
X =
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
 W
K
 ,
such that
rk
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 (A.1)
for every |Z| ≤ k. Towards this end, we select a random U and show that the probability of the
condition in (A.1) being satisfied is non-zero for a sufficiently large field. This proves the existence
of such a matrix U . We have
Pr
rk
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 , ∀|Z| ≤ k

= 1− Pr
 ⋃|Z|≤k
rk
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 6= rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z

(a)≥ 1−
∑
|Z|≤k
Pr
rk
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 6= rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z

(b)≥1−
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
|Z|≤k
Pr
rk
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 6= rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z

= 1−
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
|Z|≤k
1− Pr
rk
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z


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(c)≥ 1−
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
|Z|≤k
(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
(d)
> 0,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows by using the union bound; (ii) the inequality in (b) follows
since
(
n
t
) ≤ ( en
t
)t, and (iii) the inequality in (d) holds for sufficiently large q. In order to show the
inequality in (c), assume that Z corresponds to k1 rows in
[
0`×(R1+R2) G
]
indexed by Z1 and
k2 rows in
[
IR1+R2 U
]
indexed by Z2 with k1 + k2 ≤ k. With this, we have that
rk
 0`×(R1+R2) G
IR1+R2 U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = rk([ G ]∣∣∣
Z1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
kˆ1≤k1
+k2.
This follows since, because of the structure of the matrix, the rows in the block
[
0`×(R1+R2) G
]
are linearly independent of the rows in the block
[
IR1+R2 U
]
. Moreover, we have
rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = kˆ1 + k2,
with probability
p =
k2∏
j=1
(
1− q
kˆ1+j−1
qk
)
(e)≥
k2∏
j=1
(
1− q−1)
=
(
1− 1
q
)k2
(f)≥
(
1− 1
q
)k
,
where: (i) the inequality in (e) follows since kˆ1 + j − 1 − k ≤ −1 for all j ∈ [k2], and (ii) the
inequality in (f) follows since k2 ≤ k. This shows that the inequality in (c) above holds.
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A.2 Proof of security: Theorem 3, case 2
We here prove that, for any choice of S and G satisfying rk
([
S G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
for
all |Z| ≤ k, there exists a U in
X =
 S 0`×r G
0r×t Ir U


W ′
W
′′
K
 ,
such that
rk
 S 0`×r G
0r×t Ir U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 (A.2)
for every |Z| ≤ k. Towards this end, we select a random U and show that the probability of the
condition in (A.2) being satisfied is non-zero for a sufficiently large field. This proves the existence
of such a matrix U . By following similar steps as in the proof of Case 1 in Appendix A.1, we get
Pr
rk
 S 0`×r G
0r×t Ir U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 , ∀|Z| ≤ k

≥ 1−
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
|Z|≤k
1− Pr
rk
 S 0`×r G
0r×t Ir U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z


(a)≥ 1−
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
|Z|≤k
(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
(b)
> 0,
where the inequality in (b) holds for sufficiently large q. In order to show the inequality in
(a), assume that Z corresponds to k1 rows in
[
S 0`×r G
]
indexed by Z1 and k2 rows in[
0r×t Ir U
]
indexed by Z2 with k1 + k2 ≤ k. With this, we have that
rk
 S 0`×r G
0r×t Ir U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = rk([ S G ]∣∣∣
Z1
)
+ k2
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
kˆ1≤k1
+k2.
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This follows since, because of the structure of the matrix, the rows in the block
[
S 0`×r G
]
are linearly independent of the rows in the block
[
0r×t Ir U
]
. Moreover, we have
rk
 G
U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Z
 = kˆ1 + k2,
with probability
∏k2
j=1
(
1− qkˆ1+j−1
qk
)
≥
(
1− 1
q
)k
.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 5
In this section, we use an iterative algorithm that, for any permutation pi = {pi(1), . . . , pi(m)}
of [m], allows to select Rpi(i) vectors from Npi(i) (with Rpi(i) being defined in (2.14)) so that all
the selected
∑m
i=1 Ri vectors are linearly independent. We next illustrate the main steps of the
proposed algorithm.
1. We selectRpi(1) = dim(Npi(1)) independent vectors fromNpi(1). Note that one possible choice
for this consists of selecting the basis of the subspace Npi(1).
2. Next we would like to select independent vectors from Npi(2) that are also independent of the
Rpi(1) vectors that we selected in the previous step. Towards this end, we note that a basis of
the subspace Npi(1) + Npi(2) is a subset of the union between a basis of Npi(1) and a basis of
Npi(2). Therefore, we can keep selecting vectors from a basis of Npi(2) as long as we select
an independent vector. Since there are dim(Npi(1) +Npi(2)) independent vectors in a basis of
Npi(1) +Npi(2), then we can select
Rpi(2) = dim(Npi(1) +Npi(2))− dim(Npi(1))
independent vectors fromNpi(2) that are also independent of theRpi(1) vectors that we selected
in the previous step.
3. Similar to the above step, we now would like to select independent vectors from Npi(3) that
are also independent of the Rpi(1) + Rpi(2) vectors that we selected in the previous two steps.
Towards this end, we note that a basis of the subspace Npi(1) + Npi(2) + Npi(3) is a subset of
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the union between a basis of Npi(1) + Npi(2) and a basis of Npi(3). Therefore, we can keep
selecting vectors from a basis of Npi(3) as long as we select an independent vector. Since
there are dim(Npi(1) +Npi(2) +Npi(3)) independent vectors in a basis of Npi(1) +Npi(2) +Npi(3),
then we can select
Rpi(3) =dim(Npi(1) +Npi(2) +Npi(3))− dim(Npi(1) +Npi(2))
independent vectors from Npi(3) that are also independent of the Rpi(1) + Rpi(2) vectors that
we selected in the previous two steps.
4. We keep using the iterative procedure above for all the elements in pi, and we end up with∑m
i=1 Ri vectors that are linearly independent.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 5.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 7
In this section, we leverage the result in Lemma 5 to prove Lemma 7. We start by noting that the
rate region in (2.15) can be expressed as the following polyhedron
Pf :=
{
R ∈ R[m] : R ≥ 0,
∑
i∈A
Ri ≤ f(A), ∀ A ⊆ [m]
}
, (A.3)
where f(A) := dim (∑i∈ANi). We now prove the following lemma, which states that this func-
tion f(·) is a non-decreasing and submodular function over subsets of [m].
Lemma 29. The set function
f(A) := dim
(∑
i∈A
Ni
)
, ∀A ⊆ [m]
is a non-decreasing and submodular function.
Proof. Let A ⊂ B ⊆ [m], then
f(B) = dim
(∑
i∈B
Ni
)
= dim
∑
i∈A
Ni +
∑
j∈B\A
Nj

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≥ dim
(∑
i∈A
Ni
)
= f(A),
which proves that the function f(·) is non-decreasing. For proving submodularity, consider two
subsets C,D ⊆ [m]. Then, we have
f(C ∪ D) = dim
( ∑
i∈C∪D
Ni
)
= dim
(∑
i∈C
Ni +
∑
j∈D
Nj
)
= dim
(∑
i∈C
Ni
)
+ dim
(∑
j∈D
Nj
)
− dim
((∑
i∈C
Ni
)
∩
(∑
j∈D
Nj
))
≤ dim
(∑
i∈C
Ni
)
+ dim
(∑
j∈D
Nj
)
− dim
( ∑
k∈C∩D
Nk
)
= f(C) + f(D)− f(C ∩ D),
which proves that the function f(·) is submodular.
Since f(·) is a submodular set function, then the polyhedron defined in (A.3) is the polymatroid
associated with f(·). Moreover, since f(·) is also non-decreasing, then the corner points of the
polymatroid in (A.3) can be found as follows [Sch03, Corollary 44.3a]. Consider a permutation
pi = {pi(1), . . . , pi(m)} of [m]. Then, by letting S` = {pi(1), . . . , pi(`)} for 1 ≤ ` ≤ m, we get that
the corner points of the polymatroid in (A.3) can be written as
Rpi(`) = f(S`)− f(S`−1).
Note that by using f(A) = dim (∑i∈ANi), the above corner points are precisely those in (2.14)
in Lemma 5. Since each rate m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm), with Ri, i ∈ [m] being defined in (2.14),
can be securely achieved by our proposed scheme, it follows that the secure rate region in (2.15)
can also be achieved by our scheme. This concludes the proof of Lemma 7.
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A.5 Analysis of the dimension of (V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3)
From our analysis, we have obtained
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) ≤ k + [k −M∩{i,j}]+ + [k −M∩{`,{i,j}}]+ + t−M{1,2,3}. (A.4)
We now further consider two cases.
Case 3A: There exists a pair (i, j) ∈ [3]2, i 6= j, such that M∩{i,j} ≥ k. In this case, with the
permutation (i, j, `), the expression in (A.4) becomes
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) ≤ k + [k −M∩{`,{i,j}}]+ + t−M{1,2,3}
= t−M{1,2,3} + max{2k −M∩{`,{i,j}}, k}.
From (2.23), this implies that
dim(N1 +N2 +N3) ≥M{1,2,3} −max{2k −M∩{`,{i,j}}, k}
= min
{
M{1,2,3} − k,M{`} +M{i,j} − 2k
}
,
where the last equality follows sinceM{1,2,3} = M{i,j}+M{`}−M∩{`,{i,j}}. With this, the condition
in (2.21) is satisfied.
Case 3B: We have M∩{i,j} < k, ∀(i, j) ∈ [3]2, i 6= j. In this case, we compute dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3)
as follows: we first fill the positions of x indexed byM1 with k degrees of freedom, and then fill
the positions of x indexed byM2 with (k −M∩{1,2}) degrees of freedom as before. Now, we may
have fixed more than k positions of x corresponding to indexes inM3, which is not feasible. If
that is the case, we backtrack (i.e., remove excess degrees of freedom) that we have used for filling
positions of x indexed byM2. Thus,
1. If M∩{3,{1,2}} ≤ k, then
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) ≤ t−M{1,2,3} + k + (k −M∩{1,2}}) + (k −M∩{3,{1,2}}).
This, from (2.23), implies
dim(N1 +N2 +N3) ≥M{1} +M{2} +M{3} − 3k,
which satisfies the condition in (2.21).
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2. If M∩{3,{1,2}} > k, then
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) ≤ t−M{1,2,3} + k + (k −M∩{1,2})
−min{k −M∩{1,2},M∩{3,{1,2}} − k}.
This, from (2.23), implies
dim(N1 +N2 +N3)
≥min{M{1,2,3} − k,M{1} +M{2} +M{3} − 3k} ,
which satisfies the condition in (2.21).
A.6 Proof of security: separable networks
In this section, we show that for any choice of G of size |E| ×M[m] with M[m] ≥ k, there exists a
V˜ such that V˜ is an MDS matrix (i.e., any k rows of V˜ are linearly independent) and
rk
([
GM GV˜
]∣∣∣
Z
)
= rk
([
GV˜
]∣∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k. (A.5)
We start by noting that
rk
([
GV˜
]∣∣∣
Z
)
= rk
(
G|Z · V˜
)
≤ rk
([
GM GV˜
]∣∣∣
Z
)
= rk
(
G|Z ·
[
M V˜
])
≤ rk (G|Z) .
Thus, if we prove that, for all |Z| ≤ k,
rk
(
G|Z · V˜
)
= rk (G|Z) , (A.6)
then we also show that (A.5) holds. In what follows, we formally prove that a V˜ such that V˜ is an
MDS matrix that satisfies the condition in (A.6) for all |Z| ≤ k can be constructed with a non-zero
probability. Towards this end, we let kˆ = rk (G|Z), where kˆ ≤ k since |Z| ≤ k. We have
Pr
{{
rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k
}
∩
{
V˜ is MDS
}}
(a)
= 1− Pr
{{
rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k
}c
∪
{
V˜ is not MDS
}}
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(b)≥ 1− Pr
{
rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k
}c
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1
−Pr
{
V˜ is not MDS
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows by using the De Morgan’s laws, and (ii) the inequality in (b)
follows since for two events A and B, we have Pr(A ∪ B) ≤ Pr(A) + Pr(B). We now further
upper bound the two probability terms P1 and P2. For P1, we obtain
P1 = Pr
{
rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k
}c
(c)
= Pr

 ⋂
Z:|Z|≤k
AZ
c (d)= Pr
 ⋃Z:|Z|≤k(AZ)c
 (e)≤ ∑Z:|Z|≤k Pr {(AZ)c}
(f)≤
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
Z:|Z|≤k
Pr {(AZ)c} =
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
Z:|Z|≤k
(1− Pr {AZ})
(g)
≤
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
Z:|Z|≤k
(
1− Pr
{
AˆZ
})
(h)
=
(
e|E|
k
)k1− kˆ−1∏
i=0
(
1− q
i
qkˆ
)
(i)≤
(
e|E|
k
)k(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
,
where: (i) the equality in (c) follows by defining, for a given Z such that |Z| ≤ k, the event
AZ =
{
rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)}
,
(ii) the equality in (d) follows by using the De Morgan’s laws; (iii) the inequality in (e) follows by
using the union bound; (iv) the inequality in (f) follows since
(
n
t
) ≤ ( en
t
)t; (v) the inequality in (g)
follows by defining the event AˆZ as
AˆZ =
{
rk
(
GˆVˆ
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)}
,
where Gˆ is the matrix formed by the kˆ = rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
independent rows of
[
G
]∣∣∣
Z
, and Vˆ is
formed by the first kˆ columns of V˜ . Thus, the inequality in (g) then follows since AˆZ ⊆ AZ ; (vi)
the equality in (h) follows due to the following computation. We write
Vˆ =
[
v1 v2 . . . vkˆ
]
=⇒ GˆVˆ =
[
Gˆv1 Gˆv2 . . . Gˆvkˆ
]
.
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Note that the matrix GˆVˆ is of full rank (equal to kˆ) if the only solution to
∑kˆ
i=1 ciGˆvi = 0 is
ci = 0,∀i ∈ [kˆ]. Let Nˆ be the null space of Gˆ, and Nˆ⊥ be the space such that Nˆ⊥ ∩ Nˆ = ∅ and
Nˆ⊥ ∪ Nˆ = FM[m]q . Then, we can write each vi, i ∈ [kˆ], as the sum of its projection on Nˆ (say
v
(a)
i ) and the residual in Nˆ
⊥ (say v(b)i ). This implies that GˆVˆ is of full rank if the only solution to∑kˆ
i=1 ciGˆv
(b)
i = 0 is ci = 0,∀i ∈ [kˆ] (because Gˆv(a)i = 0). Since a random choice of vi results in a
random choice on v(b)i , then the probability of GˆVˆ being of full rank is equal to the probability that
all the vectors v(b)i , i ∈ [kˆ] are mutually independent in Nˆ⊥. This probability, since dim(Nˆ⊥) = kˆ,
is equal to
∏kˆ−1
i=0
(
1− qi
qkˆ
)
; finally, (vii) the inequality in (i) follows since i − kˆ ≤ −1 for all
i ∈ [0 : kˆ − 1] and kˆ ≤ k.
For P2, we obtain
P2 = Pr
{
V˜ is not MDS
}
(j)
= Pr

 ⋂
S:|S|=k
As
c (k)= Pr
 ⋃S:|S|=k(AS)c

(`)
=
(
M[m]
k
)
Pr {(AS)c} =
(
M[m]
k
)
(1− Pr {AS}) (m)=
(
M[m]
k
)(
1−
k−1∏
i=0
qk − qi
qk
)
(n)
≤
(
M[m]
k
)(
1−
k−1∏
i=0
(
1− 1
q
))
=
(
M[m]
k
)(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
,
where: (i) the equality in (j) follows by defining, for a given S such that |S| = k, the event
AS =
{
V˜ |S is full rank
}
,
(ii) the equality in (k) follows by using the De Morgan’s laws; (iii) the equality in (`) follows by
selecting uniformly at random all the subsets of k rows out of the M[m] rows, (iv) the equality in
(m) follows by counting arguments to ensure that the k selected rows are all independent, and (v)
the inequality in (n) follows since i− k ≤ −1 for all i ∈ [0 : k − 1].
Thus, we obtain
Pr
{{
rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k
}
∩
{
V˜ is MDS
}}
≥ 1−
(
e|E|
k
)k(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
−
(
M[m]
k
)(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
> 0,
where the last inequality holds for sufficiently large values of q.
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A.7 Proof of Theorem 19 and Corollary 21
We start by computing RXt|ZN1 . Note that given a sequence of transmitted symbol Z
N
1 there are
two possible values of sequence of message symbols XN1 which are X
N
1 = Z
N
1 and X
N
1 = Z˜
N
1 ,
where Z˜t is α−1t (Zt).
The posterior probability of Xt = Zt given ZN1 i.e., Pr(Xt = Zt|ZN1 ) will be equal to
Pr(XN1 = Z
N
1 |ZN1 ) := pZ . We note that pZ = f(Z)f(Z)+f(Z˜) , where Z˜ := [(Z˜1)T , (Z˜2)T , . . . , (Z˜N)T ]T .
Then, E(Xt|ZN1 ) = pZZt + (1− pZ)(Z˜t). With this,
RXt|ZN1 = EXt|ZN1
[(
Xt − E(Xt|ZN1 )
) (
Xt − E(Xt|ZN1 )
)T]
= pZ(1− pZ)2(Zt − Z˜t)(Zt − Z˜t)T
+ (1− pZ)p2Z(Zt − Z˜t)(Zt − Z˜t)T
= pZ(1− pZ)(Zt − Z˜t)(Zt − Z˜t)T
DE =
1
N
EZ
N∑
t=1
tr
(
RXt|ZN1
)
=
1
N
EZ
N∑
t=1
tr
(
pZ(1− pZ)(Zt − Z˜t)(Zt − Z˜t)T
)
=
1
N
EZ
N∑
t=1
pZ(1− pZ)tr
(
(Zt − Z˜t)(Zt − Z˜t)T
)
=
1
N
EZ
N∑
t=1
pZ(1− pZ)‖Zt − Z˜t‖2
=
1
N
EZ
N∑
t=1
fX(Z)fX(Z˜)
(fX(Z) + fX(Z˜))2
‖Zt − Z˜t‖2.
Now, ZN1 is the transmitted symbols if X
N
1 = Z
N
1 and key was zero or if {Xt = Z˜t, ∀t ∈ [N ]}
and key was one. So fZ(Z) =
fX(Z)+fX(Z˜)
2
. Thus DE ,
=
1
N
EZ
N∑
t=1
fX(Z)fX(Z˜)
(fX(Z) + fX(Z˜))2
‖Zt − Z˜t‖2
=
1
N
∫
fZ(Z)
N∑
t=1
fX(Z)fX(Z˜)
(fX(Z) + fX(Z˜))2
‖Zt − Z˜t‖2dZ
=
1
2N
∫ N∑
t=1
fX(Z)fX(Z˜)
fX(Z) + fX(Z˜)
‖Zt − Z˜t‖2 dZ
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=
1
2N
EX
N∑
t=1
fX(X˜)
fX(X) + fX(X˜)
‖Zt − Z˜t‖2
=
1
2N
EX
N∑
t=1
fX(α
−1(X))
fX(X) + fX(α−1(X))
‖Xt − α−1t (Xt)‖2,
which proves (4.8). Again, if we can choose St’s, bt’s where αt() is mirroring across planes
given by Stx = bt such that,
fX(X) = fX(α
−1(X)), ∀X ∈ RnN ,
the distortion DE becomes,
DE =
1
4N
EX
N∑
t=1
‖Xt − α−1t (Xt)‖2
(a)
=
1
N
N∑
t=1
EXt‖StXt − bt‖2
=
1
N
N∑
t=1
tr
(
StRXt(St)
T + (bt − StµXt)(bt − StµXt)T
)
,
where (a) follows as αt(.) is mirroring across plane given by Stx = bt, and thus αt(x) = α−1t (x) =
(I − 2(St)TSt)Xt + 2(St)T bt. This proves (4.11).
A.8 Proof for Theorem 27
Let the shared key K is (K1, K2, . . . , Kn) where all Ki’s are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed in
{0, 1}3. Let us also assume that X = (X(1), X(2), . . . , X(n)), where each X(i) ∈ R. Similar
to the scheme for scalar case, we create a random vector V = (V (1), . . . , V (n)) where V (i) =
(X(i) − µ(i))/√Σii, and encode V (i) using key Ki as in the case of a scalar for all i ∈ [n]. Thus,
the distortion DW will be,
DW = min
Z
tr(RX|Z) = min
Z
n∑
i=1
Var(X(i)|Z)
= min
Z
n∑
i=1
(Σii)Var(V (i)|Z) =
n∑
i=1
(Σii) min
Z
Var(V (i)|Z)
=
n∑
i=1
(Σii) min
Z(i)
Var(V (i)|Z(i)) = c
n∑
i=1
(Σii) = c tr(Σ),
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where c = 0.9998. And since tr(Σ) is the expected distortion even when the adversary has no
observations, and as we can not beat this by (4.6), this is optimal.
A.9 Proof for Theorem 28
Distortion at the adversary’s end. Based on the coding scheme we can see that the adversary get
BUt +wt by just subtracting AZt from Zt+1 for t ∈ [1 : N − 1]. So the adversary’s information is
given by following set:
Einfo = {Z1, BUt + wt, t ∈ [1 : N − 1]}
= {f(X1, K), BUt + wt, t ∈ [1 : N − 1]} .
Thus, D(t, ZN1 ) = D(t, Einfo) = tr(RXt|Einfo). Let’s first compute D(t = 1, Z
N
1 ),
D(t = 1, ZN1 ) = tr(RX1|Einfo)
(a)
= tr(RX1|f(X1,K))
(b)
= c tr(Σ),
where (a) is because Ut and wt are independent on Xt and (b) is due to the encoding used in
Theorem 27 with c = 0.9998.
Now, for other time instances we can use induction to prove that we will have worst case
distortion at least tr(Σ).
D(t+ 1, ZN1 ) = tr(RXt+1|Einfo) = tr(R(AXt+BUt+wt)|Einfo)
= tr(R(AXt)|Einfo) = tr(ARXt|EinfoA
T ) = tr(ATARXt|Einfo)
(a)
= tr(V ΛV TRXt|Einfo) = tr(ΛV
TRXt|EinfoV )
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
λidi(V
TRXt|EinfoV )
(c)
≥
∑
i∈[n]
di(V
TRXt|EinfoV )
(d)
=
∑
i∈[n]
νi(V
TRXt|EinfoV )=
∑
i∈[n]
νi(RXt|Einfo)
= tr(RXt|Einfo)
(e)
≥ c tr(Σ),
where in (a), we do eigenvalue decomposition of ATA which is a positive definite matrix and
thus will have non negative eigenvalues; in (b) di(V TRXt|EinfoV ) is the i-th diagonal entry of
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V TRXt|EinfoV ; (c) is true because V
TRXt|EinfoV is a positive definite matrix and all the diagonal
entries of a positive semi definite matrix are non-negative and because of our assumption that sin-
gular values of A, i.e. the square root of eigenvalues of ATA are all more than one; (d) is because
summation of eigenvalues is equal to the sum of all the diagonal entries for any square matrix,
where νi(V TRXt|EinfoV ) is the i-th eigenvalue of V
TRXt|EinfoV ; (e) follows by the induction.
93
REFERENCES
[ACF16] G. K. Agarwal, M. Cardone, and C. Fragouli. “Coding across unicast sessions can
increase the secure message capacity.” In 2016 IEEE Int. Symp. on Inf. Theory, pp.
2134–2138, Jul 2016.
[ACF17] Gaurav Kumar Agarwal, Martina Cardone, and Christina Fragouli. “Secure Network
Coding for Multiple Unicast: On the Case of Single Source.” In Junji Shikata, edi-
tor, Information Theoretic Security, pp. 188–207, Cham, 2017. Springer International
Publishing.
[ACL00] R. Ahlswede, Ning Cai, S. Y. R. Li, and R. W. Yeung. “Network information flow.”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 46(4):1204–1216, Jul 2000.
[AHM07] Daniel Andre´n, Lars Hellstro¨m, and Klas Markstro¨m. “On the complexity of matrix
reduction over finite fields.” Advances in applied mathematics, 39(4):428–452, 2007.
[All15] NGMN Alliance. “5G white paper.” Next generation mobile networks, white paper,
pp. 1–125, 2015.
[Aro19] Jacob Aron. “IBM unveils its first commercial quantum computer.”, 2019.
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2189909-ibm-unveils-its-first-commercial-
quantum-computer/ Last Accessed: May 9th, 2019.
[BN05] Kapil Bhattad, Krishna R Narayanan, et al. “Weakly secure network coding.” NetCod,
Apr, 104, 2005.
[CDH16] J. Corts, G. E. Dullerud, S. Han, J. L. Ny, S. Mitra, and G. J. Pappas. “Differential
privacy in control and network systems.” In 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision
and Control (CDC), pp. 4252–4272, Dec 2016.
[CHK13a] T. Cui, T. Ho, and J. Kliewer. “On Secure Network Coding With Nonuniform or
Restricted Wiretap Sets.” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 59(1):166–176,
Jan 2013.
[CHK13b] T. Cui, T. Ho, and J. Kliewer. “On Secure Network Coding With Nonuniform or
Restricted Wiretap Sets.” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 59(1):166–176,
January 2013.
[CLR09] Thomas H. Cormen, Charles E. Leiserson, Ronald L. Rivest, and Clifford Stein. Intro-
duction to Algorithms, Third Edition. The MIT Press, 3rd edition, 2009.
[CPD14] L. Czap, V. M. Prabhakaran, S. Diggavi, and C. Fragouli. “Triangle network secrecy.”
In 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, pp. 781–785, June
2014.
[CPF11] L. Czap, V.M. Prabhakaran, C. Fragouli, and S. Diggavi. “Secret message capacity of
erasure broadcast channels with feedback.” In IEEE Inf. Theory Workshop (ITW), pp.
65–69, 2011.
94
[CT06] Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series
in Telecommunications and Signal Processing). Wiley-Interscience, New York, NY,
USA, 2006.
[CY02] Ning Cai and R. W. Yeung. “Secure network coding.” In Proceedings IEEE Interna-
tional Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT),, pp. 323–, July 2002.
[CY07] N. Cai and R. W. Yeung. “A Security Condition for Multi-Source Linear Network
Coding.” In 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, pp. 561–
565, June 2007.
[DCN09] Jing Dong, Reza Curtmola, and Cristina Nita-Rotaru. “Secure network coding for
wireless mesh networks: Threats, challenges, and directions.” Computer Communica-
tions, 32(17):1790–1801, 2009.
[DOM19] DOMO.COM. “Data Never Sleeps 6.0.”, 2019. https://www.domo.com/learn/data-
never-sleeps-6 Last Accessed: May 9th, 2019.
[ECF18] Y. H. Ezzeldin, M. Cardone, C. Fragouli, and G. Caire. “Gaussian 1-2-1 Networks:
Capacity Results for mmWave Communications.” arXiv:1801.02553, January 2018.
[ES07] Salim Y El Rouayheb and Emina Soljanin. “On wiretap networks II.” In Information
Theory, 2007. ISIT 2007. IEEE International Symposium on, pp. 551–555. IEEE, 2007.
[FMS04] Jon Feldman, Tal Malkin, C Stein, and RA Servedio. “On the capacity of secure net-
work coding.” In Proc. 42nd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control,
and Computing, pp. 63–68, 2004.
[HLK04] Tracey Ho, Ben Leong, Ralf Koetter, Muriel Me´dard, Michelle Effros, and David R
Karger. “Byzantine modification detection in multicast networks using randomized
network coding.” In Information Theory, 2004. ISIT 2004. Proceedings. International
Symposium on, p. 144. IEEE, 2004.
[JLK07] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi, and M. Medard. “Resilient net-
work coding in the presence of Byzantine adversaries.” In IEEE INFOCOM 2007
- 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 616–624,
May 2007.
[JSC05] S. Jaggi, P. Sanders, P. A. Chou, M. Effros, S. Egner, K. Jain, and L. M. G. M. Tol-
huizen. “Polynomial time algorithms for multicast network code construction.” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 51(6):1973–1982, June 2005.
[KM03] R. Koetter and M. Medard. “An algebraic approach to network coding.” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, 11(5):782–795, October 2003.
[KM12] Vijay Kumar and Nathan Michael. “Opportunities and challenges with autonomous
micro aerial vehicles.” The International Journal of Robotics Research, 31(11):1279–
1291, 2012.
95
[KOK17] Kaoru Kurosawa, Hiroyuki Ohta, and Kenji Kakuta. “How to make a linear network
code (strongly) secure.” Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 82(3):559–582, 2017.
[KSK09] Azadeh Khaleghi, Danilo Silva, and Frank R Kschischang. “Subspace codes.” In IMA
International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, pp. 1–21. Springer, 2009.
[KTT09] O. Kosut, L. Tong, and D. Tse. “Nonlinear network coding is necessary to combat gen-
eral Byzantine attacks.” In 2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control, and Computing (Allerton), pp. 593–599, Sept 2009.
[KTW14] S. Kamath, D. N. C. Tse, and C. C. Wang. “Two-unicast is hard.” In IEEE Interna-
tional Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pp. 2147–2151, June 2014.
[LLE13] E. J. Lee, M. Langberg, and M. Effros. “Outer bounds and a functional study of the
edge removal problem.” In 2013 IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), pp. 1–5,
Sep. 2013.
[Mau93] U. M. Maurer. “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common informa-
tion.” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,, 39(3):733–742, 1993.
[MMS13] Waseem A Malik, Nuno C Martins, and Ananthram Swami. “LQ control under secu-
rity constraints.” In Control of Cyber-Physical Systems, pp. 101–120. Springer, 2013.
[MS11] A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst. “Robust Beamforming for Security in MIMO
Wiretap Channels With Imperfect CSI.” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing,
59(1):351–361, Jan 2011.
[MSC08] A. Mills, B. Smith, T. C. Clancy, E. Soljanin, and S. Vishwanath. “On secure commu-
nication over wireless erasure networks.” In 2008 IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory, pp. 161–165, July 2008.
[PCF14] Athanasios Papadopoulos, La´szlo´ Czap, and Christina Fragouli. “Secret message ca-
pacity of a line network.” CoRR, abs/1407.1922, 2014.
[PCF15] Athanasios Papadopoulos, Laszlo Czap, and Christina Fragouli. “LP formulations for
secrecy over erasure networks with feedback.” In 2015 IEEE Int. Symp. on Inf. Theory,
pp. 954–958, June 2015.
[RW09] Aditya Ramamoorthy and Richard D Wesel. “The single source two terminal network
with network coding.” arXiv:0908.2847, August 2009.
[SC14] Curt Schieler and Paul Cuff. “Rate-distortion theory for secrecy systems.” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, 60(12):7584–7605, 2014.
[SCA16] I. Safaka, L. Czap, K. Argyraki, and C. Fragouli. “Creating Secrets Out of Packet
Erasures.” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 11(6):1177–
1191, June 2016.
[Sch03] Alexander Schrijver. Combinatorial optimization: polyhedra and efficiency, vol-
ume B. Springer Science & Business Media, 2003.
96
[Sha49] Claude E Shannon. “Communication theory of secrecy systems.” Bell Labs Technical
Journal, 28(4):656–715, 1949.
[SK09] Danilo Silva and Frank R Kschischang. “Universal weakly secure network coding.”
In Networking and Information Theory, 2009. ITW 2009. IEEE Information Theory
Workshop on, pp. 281–285. IEEE, 2009.
[STA19] STATISTA.COM. “Internet of Things (IoT) connected devices in-
stalled base worldwide from 2015 to 2025 (in billions).”, 2019.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iot-number-of-connected-devices-
worldwide/ Last Accessed: May 9th, 2019.
[TGP16] Anastasios Tsiamis, Konstantinos Gatsis, and George J. Pappas. “State Estimation
with Secrecy against Eavesdroppers.” CoRR, abs/1612.04942, 2016.
[TGP17] Anastasios Tsiamis, Konstantinos Gatsis, and George J. Pappas. “State-Secrecy Codes
for Networked Linear Systems.” CoRR, abs/1709.04530, 2017.
[TSS17] T. Tanaka, M. Skoglund, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson. “Directed informa-
tion and privacy loss in cloud-based control.” In 2017 American Control Conference
(ACC), pp. 1666–1672, May 2017.
[Vai89] P. M. Vaidya. “Speeding-up linear programming using fast matrix multiplication.” In
30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 332–337, Oct 1989.
[WJO16] M. Wiese, K. H. Johansson, T. J. Oechtering, P. Papadimitratos, H. Sandberg, and
M. Skoglund. “Uncertain wiretap channels and secure estimation.” In 2016 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pp. 2004–2008, July 2016.
[WYG10] Y. Wei, Z. Yu, and Y. Guan. “Efficient Weakly-Secure Network Coding Schemes
against Wiretapping Attacks.” In 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Network
Coding (NetCod), pp. 1–6, June 2010.
[Wyn75] A. D. Wyner. “The wire-tap channel.” The Bell System Technical Journal, 54(8):1355–
1387, 1975.
[Yam88] Hirosuke Yamamoto. “A rate-distortion problem for a communication system with a
secondary decoder to be hindered.” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 34(4):835–842, 1988.
97
